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Abstract 
 
Speculating the triggers of conflicts, in general, is complicated. Over time, there have been 
diverse debates on the drivers of violent conflict, in pastoral areas and the conceptualisation of 
novel ideologies. The paper identifies and examines the core factors that trigger, and drive the 
conflict in the Turkana area. A political and ecologically marginal arid area, occupied by nomads 
in Northern Kenya and Southern Ethiopia. This review finds that both environmental stresses 
brought about by climate change, political circumstance, and cultural components all contribute 
and play a crucial role in the onset of conflict in the Turkana area. These multiple causative 
factors are necessary to comprehend the strife in the studied area. Also noteworthy is the social 
structure of the Turkana tribe, and how acts of raiding (stealing livestock) have contributed to 
insecurity and violence in the area. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
To the west of the Turkana lake, in Kenya, is an area populated by the Turkana tribes. This area 
is the area that is specifically investigated in this paper.  
Firstly, the theoretical understanding of resource conflicts is put analyzed. Not specifically to the 
investigated area, but in a global perspective. This includes Malthus´ theory about the 
relationship between population growth and resource scarcity. This theory have though been 
criticized by both Marx and Engels, who argue that the resource conflicts should be understood 
in the context of the capitalistic economic system. This theoretical overview continues with 
Harvey, who did, based on Marx's theories, create the theory of “accumulation by 
dispossession”. Hereafter is introduced the scarcity-conflict model, which was created by 
Homer-Dixon. This model indicates that it is the scarcity of environmental resource that is 
central reason for conflict. However, this is criticized by Betsy Hartmann, who argue that it is the 
scarcity of justice that is the central reason for conflicts. It is, though, emphasized in the paper 
that there are multiple reasons for conflicts. Among those are: ideology, territory, religion, 
language, self-determination, dominance, markets, equality, revenge, ancient hatreds, ethnicity 
and also the environmental and resource based factors. The theoretical part of the paper then 
continues with looking at the greed versus grievance theory. Overall, the theoretical part of the 
paper provides an understanding of the various schools of thought that explain the reasons for 
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the onset of conflicts around the world, and therefore also, an understanding that is applied to 
the understanding of the Turkana area.  
 
The literature on pastoralism is increasingly growing. Studies have shown how pastoralists, in 
the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands of the Horn of Africa, experience violent conflicts and constraints 
on their livelihood and economies. This adverse occurrences have been attributed to various 
factors as aforementioned. In this paper, we argue that understanding the conflict in the 
Turkana area of Kenya goes beyond taking cues from the mainstream generalization of triggers 
of conflict. To understand pastoralist, one must understand pastoralism. We discuss the 
necessity of viewing violent conflicts from the context of local actors and factors. It conspicuous 
that climate change has contributed to the onset of conflicts due to the alarming reduction of 
environmental resources, like the Lake Turkana. Our study also indicates that the case of 
Turkana can be understood by understanding the multiple causes of pastoral conflict in the 
region. Imperatively, it is necessary to examine the role of the Kenyan state, and how they have 
contributed to the frail condition of Turkana pastoral area. A better understanding of the conflicts 
in Turkana area requires a view of the impact of political and economic marginalisation 
experienced by the pastoralist tribe. While studies have suggested that the increasing human 
population of the pastoral tribe has contributed to the onset of conflict, other studies insist that 
data on pastoral demographics are scarce and inaccurate (due to various factors) and thus 
cannot be relied upon for indicative conclusions regarding population trend, thereby 
contradicting the population explosion-conflict argument. The Turkana pastoralist have 
experienced loss of herding lands to ranches, private farms, and urbanization among others. As 
aforementioned, the issue of governance and role of the state needs a structural revision to 
ensure the inclusion of the pastoral tribes in developmental policies.  
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2. Problem definition 
 
What are the important aspects and factors that create and sustain conflicts, specifically in 
Pastoral areas? One could look at the resource scarcity in the area, and simply conclude this to 
be the reason for the conflicts, but would that be a simple assumption and conclusion? We want 
to focus specifically on the area where Turkana people live, but does this, however, mean that 
the understanding of the area that Turkana people in should be based only on the area itself? 
This is since that the Turkana area, the studied area, is possibly interacting with both people 
living outside of the area and physical aspects outside the area itself. Conclusively, the pre-
understanding of the Turkana area is that both the area itself and possibly the surrounding 
areas as well are important to the understanding of the conflicts in the area.   
 
How can the conflicts occurring in the pastoral area, where the Turkana people live, be 
understood?  
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3. Methodology 
 
The approach adopted for this study, to understand the problem definition, first entail the 
dissection of the pastoral society by looking at three important factors that are important to 
understanding the conflicts. The three major factors examined include the environmental 
perspective, the social structure and cultural dimensions, and the role of government and the 
state. This research explores the different theoretical positions on the triggers of conflict. First 
we examine the environmental-scarcity thesis, as put forward by Homer-Dixon; we also chip in 
the postulation of the Malthusian theory on the role of population increase in the onset of 
conflict. In order to understand the influence of the societal structure on the onset of conflict, we 
briefly introduce the Karl Marx sociological theory of society, and how it relates. Furthermore the 
greed and grievance theory of resource scarcity was analyzed, and also the spiral of violence 
theory as put forward by Scheffran. Finally, this study discusses empirical studies on the 
pastoral areas, and show how these theories correlate with the reality on ground, in the 
explanation of our problem definition. 
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4. Theory 
 
4.1 Resource conflicts 
 
Population, scarcity and capitalism. 
Scarcity has been a concern for many years. Back in the 18th century Thomas Malthus made a 
theory about the danger of uncontrolled population growth, where the number of people would 
increase in a faster rate than the food supply. This would end in a population crash after the 
population growth had reached a point in which food sources could not support the population 
anymore(Ehrlish & Lui 1997, 207-08).  Later this theory was criticized by e.g. Marx and Engels, 
in the 19th century, as population increase, according to Marx, must be understood in the 
context of the capitalistic economic system. As a worker is paid less than the value of his 
productivity a surplus is created for the capitalist himself.  The surplus might be invested in 
machinery leading to an increase in unemployment, which further will result in a lowering in 
wages. As such poverty, hunger and other social ills are the result of socially unjust practices 
associated with capitalism. Land tenure systems, landlordism etcetera are according to Marx 
responsible for low food production and only in places where food production is not sufficient 
does population growth become a problem (McQuillan 1982,109-110). Accumulation will take 
place when capitalists convert some of their surplus into new capital, by expansion, to promote 
more surplus value. The so called primitive accumulation entailed taking land and expelling or 
dispossession of the people living there, often indigenous people. Harvey did many years later, 
in the early 21st century, build on Marx theory by creating the theory of “accumulation by 
dispossession” as capitalism’s answer to its problem of over-accumulation and its needs to find 
outlets for this capital surplus (Hall 2013, 382).  In the mid-20th century Malthus theory got 
reconsidered into neo-Malthusianism, which became prominent in the environmentalist thinking 
of environmental crisis in the Third World and the formulation of the sustainable development 
patterns, and included the idea of the relationship between population growth, scarcity and 
violence (Neumann 2004, 817).  
 
In the 1990s Homer-Dixon created a scarcity model.Theoretically, the scarcity-conflict model 
connects increasing population growth, scarcity of a renewable resource, and migration, to the 
onset of violent conflicts. In the developing world, according to Homer-Dixon, violent struggles 
ensue as a result of scarcity of natural resources (like water, cropland, fishes, etcetera), which 
comes to be, due to increasing population growth (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Dixon’s concept of 
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scarcity-conflict indicates causal factors of “environmental scarcity” to include the degradation 
and depletion of renewable resources, the increased use of the resources (due to increasing 
demand), and the uneven distribution of the resources. Homer-Dixon hypothesized that a 
reduction in the supply of physically manageable natural resources like clean water and good 
agricultural land could trigger interstate resource war or “simple-scarcity conflicts”. He argues 
that the massive migration of people due to environmental stresses (for example severe 
drought) in their community can induce “group- identity conflicts” and provoke ethnic clashes. In 
the scenario of severe environmental scarcity, Homer-Dixon holds it that, acute economic 
deprivation and disruption of essential social institutions can ensue; which will trigger the onset 
of civil strife, and insurgency that he terms “deprivation conflicts” (Homer- Dixon 1994). Using 
empirical data to link environmental changes and population grown to conflicts, Homer-Dixon 
cites observational events in Mexico, Nicaragua, Mauritania, Senegal, Israel, Jordan, Gaza, 
Philippines, El Salvador, Honduras, China, Japan, South Africa, India, Pakistan, among others. 
He insists that environmental scarcity causes violent conflicts and contends that the social 
impacts of environmental scarcity can weaken states, make a state more authoritarian and, or, 
lead to conflict. Homer-Dixon concluded in 1994: “Of immediate concern are scarcities of 
cropland, water, forest and fish, whereas atmospheric changes such as global warming will 
probably not have a major effect for several decades, and then by interacting with already 
existing scarcities” (Homer-Dixon, 1994).  
 
Professor Betsy Hartmann, a senior policy analyst of the Population and Development Program, 
and a feminist activist finds the scarcity-conflict model to be deeply problematic and views it as 
a dangerous way of thinking. Hartmann argues that the scarcity-conflict theory have not 
accurately diagnosed the ailment of conflicts and poverty in the developing world. For 
Hartmann, it is the scarcity of justice, rather than a lack of resources that onsets conflicts. She 
argues that it is the systematic inequalities and unequal distribution of wealth in societies that 
lead to shortages of economic resources and environmental degradation. Subsequently she 
asserts that the scarcity-conflict theory has masked the deeper economic and political reasons 
behind poverty in the developing world, she fears that the model has distorted international 
population policies and has indirectly (mis)shaped the public opinion of the conflicts and poverty 
in the south. Moving further into her analysis of the scarcity-conflict model, Hartmann suggests 
that environmental degradation has been wrongly put in parallel with renewable resource 
scarcity; she insists that there is no link between both perceptions. Another problematic aspect 
of the scarcity-conflict model, for Hartmann, is the assimilation of population growth with 
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increased consumption. The flaw in the thinking, for Hartmann, is the failure to look beyond 
demographic factors and into external element; an increase in external demands for a resource 
can lead to increased consumption. Next, the fact of economic inequalities is missing from the 
discussion of the scarcity-conflict model, even though Homer-Dixon did recognize its importance 
and hypothesized that resource scarcity can give motive for powerful elites within a society to 
control the distribution of limited resources in their favor, through “resource capture”. Hartmann 
also countered the aspect of the scarcity-conflict model, which indicates that the scarcity of 
environmental resource can weaken states structures; and that a state can become more 
authoritarian, in a bid to control the angry citizens. The empirical cases (Pakistan, Rwanda, and 
Mexico) that were selected for Homer-Dixon’s study supposedly, as Betsy puts it, experienced a 
scarcity of democratic control over the state institutional structures that control the access to 
economic and natural resources. Nevertheless, Hartmann does ascribe to the idea that 
population growth does play a role in environmental degradation, but she insist that population 
growth does not play a decisive role in the complex picture. To better understand conflicts, it is 
necessary to use an approach that encompasses the complicated and steadily changing 
economic, political, cultural, historical and environmental dynamics of a particular setting 
(Hartmann, 1998).  
 
Contemporary conflicts 
During the post-1945 period and the Cold War, the experiences of two world wars led to an 
overwhelming focus on interstate wars, nuclear deterrence, arms races and balances of power. 
Meanwhile there was an increase in violent conflicts within societies, which did not draw much 
attention, though these conflicts represented about three times the magnitude of interstate wars. 
As such there was a six-fold increase in societal conflicts between the 1950s and the early 
1990s (Porto 2002, 2-3). 
 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, which were seen as the final 
triumph of the neo-liberal democratic model, created a power vacuum and a unipolar new world 
order, that resulted in spread of violence and emerging of disparate groups, fighting for 
ideology, religion and ethnicity. After the Cold War, through the 1990s, these kinds of conflicts 
increased e.g. did the number of low-intensity conflicts rose from 31 in 1996 to 77 in 1999. 
These contemporary conflicts have been termed e.g. “small wars”, “civil wars” and “conflicts in 
post-colonial states” (Porto 2002, 3-4). 
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These conflicts are very complex, with several and varied factions and often external parties 
involved (providing consultation, funding, with support of equipment - in some cases maybe 
direct military) and they do not have a precise beginning, no formal declaration of war, a lack of 
definitive battles and no formal endings. The conflicts typically last for long periods and are 
fought by loosely knit groups under little or no central authority. The economies are highly 
decentralized, termed the “new globalized war economy”. Often only a little part of the 
population participates directly in the conflict and they rarely involve regular armies. The 
participation is often undertaken by unemployment and a decline in domestic production and 
depends on external resources which force the parties to finance themselves via plunder, black 
market, illegal trades or support from neighboring governments or diaspora communities. The 
goals in conflicts have changed from the earlier wars geo-political or ideological goals to have 
its basis in identity, thus self-determination is considered as the primary cause of contemporary 
conflicts. The weakening of states play a central role, as such contemporary conflict primary 
appears in new and weak states, e.g. some post-colonial states (Porto 2002, 5-6). 
 
Ethnic conflicts and resource conflicts, Grievance versus greed. 
Many aspects for causes of conflicts are found within the typology like e.g. ideology, territory, 
religion, language, self-determination, dominance, markets, equality, revenge, ancient hatreds, 
ethnicity and resources (Porto 2002, 6).   Ethnicity have on one hand been considered as 
inherited group characteristics (some argue it is biologically/ancestry based and 
immutable/innate) and on the other hand it has been seen as a fluid and negotiable aspect of 
identity, socially constructed. As such ethnicity is not something that can be decided by 
individuals, but is embedded within the larger society, a relational framework. Cultural identities 
might be more enduring and stronger than other collective identities, but also sometimes 
provide the basis for unfortunate and unpleasant distinctions among people (Porto 2002, 7-8) 
 
Particularly in the developing world, conflicts are also driven by resources and economic 
agendas. Until recently studies mostly have been centered on the role played by scarcity of 
resources and grievances as the primary trigger of these conflicts and it has been considered 
that societies of low development levels have suffered much more from conflicts than rich 
countries during the last half of the 20th century. These conflicts, regarded as driven by 
grievances, are related to factors as ethnic and cultural identity, inequality, historical 
animosities, unequal growth and distribution, marginalization and discrimination of certain ethnic 
groups and political repression (Porto 2002, 8). More recently Collier and Hoeffler defined a 
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greed hypothesis using a model based on expected utility theory developed through statistical 
investigation of large scale civil conflicts since 1965 by studying four variables: Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation; population size; natural resource endowment and per capita income. In this 
study Collier and Hoeffler fund that the factors which may provide to grievance do not seem to 
increase risk of conflicts but that the main driver seems to be economic factors and by that 
greed seems more important than grievance as the driver for conflicts. They found that factors 
that might lead to grievance, like highly fractionalized societies are not more prone to conflicts 
than homogeneous societies but that polarized societies (into two groups) have a 50 % higher 
probability for conflicts. The effect of population size is ambiguous and other factors which might 
contribute to grievance (e.g. political repression and income inequality) do not seem to increase 
the risk of conflict. Instead low education, high proportion of young men, trade of primary 
commodities and economic decline, leads to an increased risk for conflicts (Porto 2002, 9-10). 
 
By these conclusions of Collier and Hoeffler a debate on greed versus grievance was started. 
Grievances was tested via 5 variables, which showed that rapid economic decline and political 
transitions, increase the risk of conflict but that inequality (both when it comes to income and 
land ownership) has no effect. Like the former test, the result concerning political repression 
were ambiguous showing that democratic society is safer than a partial democracy, but only 
with a moderate effect and not significant. The test of ethnic and religious (society) 
fractionalization showed the same result as in the “greed test”. As such it was seen that even 
though economics opportunities (greed) seems to be the primary driver, the discourse behind 
starting a conflict might be grievance (Porto 2002, 10).  Primary commodity exports were 
included as a measure for greed and it was found that this factor massively increased the risk of 
conflicts. As conflict are dependent on recruits it was also shown that high proportions of young 
men in the society and a low level of education increase the risk of conflicts.  Furthermore, even 
though the costs of civil wars are very high, it provides the opportunity for enrichment and 
economic profit (Porto 2002, 11 & 14). The greed theory got criticized for its methods as e.g. 
statistics require an oversimplification of data. It also lacks the factor that the deprivation and the 
distribution of resources within countries and communities play as a source of creating 
grievance and by that mobilizing people for participating in conflicts. As such, political violence 
may result from the difference between expectations and fulfillment - what they want and what 
they get. It has been pointed out that increased competition over access to major resources, as, 
for example, allocation of shared water supplies, have produced a new geography of conflict in 
which resource flows constitute the major fault lines. (Porto 2002, 12-14).             
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The critics led to the development of a model that combine greed and grievance and the use of 
the notations “preferences and constraints”. Constraints considered were e.g. the size of rebel 
organizations (mobilized people) and the number of weapons available. The financing of this 
has primary happened via plundering of primary commodities.      
 
When it comes to preferences it was not found that inter-group hatred is greater in fractured 
societies than in homogenous ones, but like earlier mentioned polarization of two groups is a 
crucial variable for this. Political exclusion was seen to have an effect as societies enrolled in 
conflict. This political exclusion had a strong link to the extent of democracy. Marginalization of 
the poor and ethnic dominance showed no significant result as conflicts today are rarely started 
by these groups of people (Porto 2002, 15-16). The conclusion of these different models is that 
the role of income, population characteristics, ethnic and religious fractionalization, education 
levels, geography, previous conflicts and natural resource endowment are factors that all, either 
as constraints or preferences, affect possibility of conflicts. The latter factor (natural resources), 
strongly affect probability, duration, course and impact of conflicts (Porto 2002, 16).     
   
Conflicts and wars remains a major social problem. But there is no single cause of a conflict and 
there is often no single precondition for peace (Porto 2002, 1). Among other more commonly 
used variables like ethnic, religious and weak states as reasons for conflicts, scarce and 
abundant of resources both also play a role.  Conflicts linked to these ecological sources have 
had huge consequences like violence and death e.g. two million dead as a result of the conflict 
in Sudan (Porto 2002, 2). 
 
Ecological sources of conflicts 
For sub-Saharan Africa, there is a complex relationship between ecology and conflicts involving 
multiple actors and interests. Access and control of natural resources like farming land, pastures 
and water are crucial factors in the occurrence of violence and conflicts. Factors like greed and 
grievance have often motivated these conflicts (Porto 2002, 2). 
 
One of the volatile regions in sub-Saharan Africa is The Greater Horn of Africa. The conflicts in 
this area span much wider geographically and include a broader constellation of actors with 
diverse interests, than typically comprehended. Different conflicts are bind together by a number 
of linkages in this region to national, regional and international contexts. As an example, the 
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conflict between herders and farmers in the Awash Valley in Ethiopia and the Nile flood plain in 
Sudan, involving the sharing of water from the Nile and other important sources, have linkages 
to wider regional conflicts (Porto 2002, 28).   
 
The Vice-President of the World Bank, Ismail Serageldin ones said “The wars of the next 
century will be about water”, as water might be the most precious commodities in Africa in far 
future. Areas of water stress are likely to see increased competition as populations grow and 
availability of fresh water decreases at the same time.  Many large rivers, their waterbodies and 
end recipient (e.g. a lake) are trans-boundary as such water ignores political boundaries etc. 
Historically international agencies have dealt very little with international water resource conflicts 
(Flintan & Tamrat 2002, 243-44).     
 
Water resources can both be abundant and scarce at varying times and places, and for different 
individuals and groups. The conflicts, which have been triggered by the scarcity of land and 
water, have intensified due to resource capture by stronger participants in society. As such, 
even though ecological resources play a significant role in conflicts, issues like economics, 
politics, and social inequities may be among the variables where the deeper sources of the 
conflicts have to be found. If conflicts occur in places with abundance of water, the source of 
these conflicts is identifiable in longer histories of capture and protection of the resource by 
commercial or conservation interests (Flintan & Tamrat 2002, 310).  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa there is no general factor but a large variety of ecological issues that are 
relevant to conflict analysis including environmental change, scarcity and abundance of natural 
resources and the production, the marketing of and the sharing of benefits from these 
resources. Conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa operate within broader regional and international 
systems. Even apparently isolated conflicts are in reality linked to broader economic and 
political contexts involving multiple competing groups, individuals and interests.   Legal regimes, 
institutions and policies governing these, are overlapping and mixed. Conflicts are complex. 
Thus the levels of engagement and the number of variables underlying the conflicts are many 
and the operation of the conflicts is often uncertain. The ecological variables are important 
factors in conflicts and as such it is important to trace the relationship between ecology and 
conflicts through different pathways and to identify how the ecological variables are linked to 
conflicts (Porto 2002, 32).   
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Thus “Low intensity” conflicts in the Horn of Africa are strongly connected to land and natural 
resource systems. In a region with a highly ecological stress and where scarcity of natural 
resources are common, there are pockets with abundance of water resources along 
watercourses and in higher elevated areas, which leads to an uneven structure of these 
resources. The interacting groups of pastoralist have adapted to these limitations via frequent 
movements between different ecological zones, and through mutual resource sharing. 
Environmental stress and limitations are common in Africa and in many cases the driver of 
ecosystems (Porto 2002, 31). As described in chapter 5.2 these environmental features are 
changing recently as a result of several factor adding to the stress and limits. 
 
4.2. Governance-conflict theory 
 
The theoretical underpinning that links governance, political structures, and societal 
arrangement to onset of conflict can be seen in the marxist-based social conflict theory. The 
theory was first constructed by Karl Marx, the 18th century sociologist. Marx regards a nation 
state as a composite of powers in the form of political parties, who govern on behalf of society, 
by making laws and regulations (based on rational decisions, and the explanation of reality by 
science) which is all aimed at rewarding the elite class. Furthermore, the social conflict theory 
argues that the different classes within societies have varying amount of resources (material 
and nonmaterial), and that the elite class use their powers to exploit the lower classes within the 
society (Marx, 1971). The Marxist theory insists that societies are unequal and that classes exist 
within societies, and most importantly, societies operate to benefit the powerful class and 
deprive the others which in turn causes conflict. The types of conflicts range from revolutions, 
wars, communism to strike. However, this can also be transcribed into other spheres of 
contemporary conflicts - including conflicts in pastoral societies. Even though pastoral societies 
across the globe are marked by similar socioeconomic and basic characteristic of living 
(movement of herds in search of access to grazing pastures and water), and political 
differences, there still exist differences in the factors that influences the onset of conflicts in 
different pastoral societies.  
 
Most of the studies of the explanation of pastoral conflicts have adopted the schools of thought 
of environmental scarcity-conflict, and the primordial antagonism conflict theories to explain 
conflict in pastoral areas. It is important to understand the multiple causal factors of pastoral 
conflicts in general, no doubt there are economic and climatic factors that have influenced the 
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onset of conflict in these ecologically marginal (ASAL - Arid and Semi Arid Lands) areas. Tobias 
Hagmann and Alemmaya Mulugeta (2008) have put forward a state-focused interpretation of 
pastoral conflicts, that is a deeper, and contextual clarification of the pastoral violence in the 
Ethiopian pastoral societies (Hagmann et al., 2008). They find a nexus between state-building 
and pastoral conflict. Correspondingly, they insist on the necessity to view the current conflicts 
in the Ethiopian lowland regions within the context of the historic and continuing expansion of 
the Ethiopian state-building process, which involves the extension of the state's’ structures of 
control into the lowland pastoral areas. Equally important to note is that the scholars have not 
suggested that the government officials have intentionally orchestrated violent strife among the 
pastoral population, rather they have elaborated on an interpretative proposition that justifies 
that changing rationality of recent pastoral conflicts in Ethiopia. 
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5. Turkana area 
 
5.1 African Pastoralism.  
 
Around fifty percent of the world's pastoral population live in Africa. There is a total of 22 million 
pastoral people in Africa. Whereas, around 9 million of them are defined as agro-pastoral, which 
means that they are both practicing agriculture and having a large number of livestock.  
Pastoral people occupy a rich amount of the land in east African countries, such as Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda. In Kenya, the pastoralist cover 70 percent of the total land of the 
country. Furthermore, the amount of pastoralist living in this land is relative small. Fewer than 
1.5 million people live in the pastoral areas of Kenya, which is a small percentage of Kenya's 
population of 30 million. The pastoralist cover 50 percent of the total land of Tanzania, and 40 
percent of the total land of Uganda (Fratkin. 2001:3)  
 
The origin of pastoralism in Africa.  
A major climate shift took place around 4500 BP in the central Sahara. It caused an increase in 
aridity in the Central Sahara area. This meant that the rain belt retreated from the central 
Sahara area, and along with it the tsetse. All this allowed occupation of some areas that 
previously was closed to pastoralists. The occupation by pastoralists did not take place until 
4000 BP, in the area placed between Kenya and the upper part of the Nile (Smith. 1992:131). 
This will therefore also include the Turkana area, which is the studied area in this paper.  
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Map 1. The Sahara grassland niche (Smith. 1992: 129) 
 
It can be observed from this map that there was a Southward expansion of pastoral societies 
around 4000 BP. Based on this map, it can be estimated that this southward expansion also 
went towards the present-day Turkana area in Kenya .  
Early on there was no indigenously fishery in Lake Turkana, but since the 1960s an increasing 
numbers pastoralists live around the lake and in its delta area and has taken to fishing to 
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mitigate famine and destitution (Avery 2012: 22). Pastoralists and their fishery will be further 
described in chapter 5.2.8.   
 
5.2 The Turkana area - Environment 
 
5.2.1 General description of the area 
The Great Rift Valley contains many mountains, valleys and lakes - one of these is Lake 
Turkana. The Lake is situated in the eastern branch of the Rift Valley, most in the northwestern 
part of Kenya and a little tip in Southern Ethiopia, at the eastern Horn of Africa. The Horn is 
isolated from the rest of the African continent by a chain of mountains and is only interrupted by 
the low Turkana basin in Kenya, which extends northwestward into Sudan (Liebmann et al. 
2014: 8630-31). 
 
 
Map 2. Elevation in meters of the Great Horn (Liebmann et al 2014: 8631). Note Lake Turkanas position 
in the lower part between the elevated parts of Ethiopia and in central Kenya.  
 
Lake Turkana is one of the world’s largest desert lakes, being 260 km long and up to 30 km 
wide, and with a maximum depth of 109-114 m. The average depth is approximately 30 m.  The 
lake undergoes seasonal variations in water level of 1-1.5 m and annual variations of 3-4 m. 
The surface of the lake-water is currently at an elevation level of 360 m (above sea level). The 
21 
Lake Turkana basin (drainage area contributing to the lake) covers more than 130,000 km2, with 
about half in Kenya and half in Ethiopia and smaller part extending into Sudan and Uganda.   
Lake Turkana receives most of its water from the Omo River into the delta in the lakes northern 
part. The Omo River, which runs north to south in Ethiopia and has it’s headwater from the well-
watered Ethiopian Highlands, carries nutrient-rich water to Lake Turkana.  As there is no outlet 
from the lake, the water loss is due to the high evaporation in the area and as a result of this it is 
the most saline lake (salinity of 1.7-2.7 ppt.) in east Africa, but the water is still portable.     
 
The Lake Turkana basin is a lot larger than the lake itself, and due to this the shores are low 
and flat, especially in the northern and western part. The lake contains 3 volcanic islands 
(North-, Central- and South Island) and according to underground activities hot springs, 
solfataras and fumaroles appears.   As shown on map 3 and 4 the Turkana area has a very 
sporadically vegetation also compared to the rest of the great Horn region.  The Lake’s water 
attracts a great deal of wildlife e.g. being a stopover for migrant birds and is a breeding ground 
for the Nile crocodile. The region is known for its extensive fossil deposits that led scientists to a 
greater understanding of the evolution of the human species(Quinn & Woodward. 2015: 405-
406; Fong. 2015: 2; Avery. 2012: 1-4).    
 
Map 3. Cover of vegetation and forest (Paeth et al 2009: 119). Note that the north western part of Kenya, where the 
Turkana area is, has very little cover by vegetation. 
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Map 4. The land cover around Lake Turkana. It consists mainly of bare ground (light pink), open 
shrubland (creme) with patches of wooded grassland (yellow) and grassland (brown). Source:National-
Geographic. http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/maps/geography-lake-turkana/?ar_a=1 
 
 
Apart from being home and livelihood for pastoral people and fisherman there are several other 
contemporary interests in the area e.g.: The research in human origins; Several national parks, 
of which some are combined in the UNESCO World Heritage site; Production of hydroelectric 
power; Irrigation projects and development of a large wind power farm, which are all activities of 
potential effect to the area and its inhabitants (Quinn & Woodward. 2015: 405-406). 
Together with Climate Change these interests and impacts will be described in this chapter. 
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5.2.2 The area's climate 
The Climate of the Horn of Africa is tropical, but unusual, with a total annual precipitation being 
substantially lower than the rest of equatorial Africa. Most of the region is semiarid, with the 
driest conditions over northern Somalia and the highest rainfall in western highlands of Ethiopia, 
where orographic rainfall is substantial. The climate of the African Horn thus has a great spatial 
heterogeneity owing in large part to its complex terrain (Lyon. 2014:7956-57), see map 5 .The 
gap between the Ethiopian and Kenyan highlands leads to the formation of the Turkana low-
level jet, which channels southeasterly flow from the Indian Ocean inland. Across most of the 
region the annual cycle is generally bimodal characterized by two distinct wet seasons and very 
little rainfall in between. The longest wet season is in March – May and the second is short 
during October- December. Due to this, the greatest amounts of precipitation occur in March – 
May. During the two wet seasons the monsoon brings humid air from the Indian Ocean 
(Liebmann et al. 2014: 8630-31). The area around Lake Turkana has very dry conditions with 
annual precipitation average less than 200 mm. As mentioned above the area around Lake 
Turkana generally has very high temperatures and occasionally strong winds and as a result of 
this a high evaporation (see map 6). According to this it has often been described as “remote 
sub-Saharan Africa” (Quinn & Woodward, 2015:405-406). 
 
 
Map 5: Average total annual precipitation (mm) for 1979-2012. Polygon indicate areas over which 
precipitation data are averaged (Liebmann et al 2014: 8633) 
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Map 6. Simulated and observed climatology of annual precipitation in mm and near surface temperature 
during 1960-98. REMO: Regional Climate Model. CRU: Climate Research Unit dataset. (Paeth et al 2008: 
120). Note the hot and dry conditions in the Turkana area.  
 
 
5.2.3 Impacts on environment and water-resources 
 
5.2.3.1 Climate change 
Human activities have been and will in the future be affecting the earth’s climate mainly via the 
emission of greenhouse gases (e.g. CO2 and methane), aerosols and the alternation of land 
cover (Paeth et al. 2008: 114). Since 1958 measurements of the atmospheric CO2 concentration 
has been carried out every day at the Mauna Loa Observatory on Hawaii (Scripps Institution of 
Oceanography. 2015).  Analysis of CO2 -bubbles in ice-cores from the ice sheets at the Arctic 
and Antarctica, shows that the atmospheric CO2 concentrations, during the interglacial periods, 
were about 280 ppm (Holden et al. 2012: 648). At the start of the measurement at Mauna in 
1958 the CO2 - concentration were 313 ppm. As a result of anthropogenic sources the 
atmospheric concentration of CO2 has since then increased significantly and reached during 
March 2015 a level of 404 ppm (Scripps Institution of Oceanography. 2015).   
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The greenhouse effect has been predicted to cause rising temperatures and as a result of this 
cause chances in other weather patterns like the wind and precipitation.   Many impacts of the 
greenhouse effects have already been observed around the world during the last decades, like 
increasing mean temperature in the atmosphere and the sea; decreasing volume of the glaciers 
and ice sheets, rising sea levels, droughts and heavy rain events and changing and extreme 
wind patterns (IPCC. 2015:11-13).   
 
The UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has made several reports about 
expected impacts of the greenhouse effect.  As the prediction for climate change depends on 
future emissions of greenhouse gases, the IPCC have, in their latest report, listed four scenarios 
that predict global mean temperatures for the period 2081-2100 to rise between 0.8 ºC (if the 
CO2 concentration peaks at about 480 ppm) and 4.5 ºC (if the CO2 concentration >1000 ppm) 
over the mean temperature during the period 1986-2005 (IPCC. 2015: 56-58). What level we 
will have by year 2100 depends of whether we will succeed reducing the CO2 emissions 
globally.  
 
5.2.3.1.1 Climate change in the tropics 
 
Although climate change is a global challenge, the effects, like the appearance of extreme 
weather events and how fast the climate will change, is often regional. 
When it comes to greenhouse effect, the polar areas have in the last years got the most 
attention, as we will see the largest increase in temperature at this latitudes.   But the earliest 
and most extreme effects will happen in the tropics and unprecedented climates will occur first 
in the tropics, where the nature and people are least equipped to adapt. The plants and animals 
will here face a climate as no species have known and coped with until today on the earth. This 
is due to that the natural variation in air- and ocean temperatures and other climate related 
variables in the tropics are minimal, and thus only smaller climate changes will have a relatively 
large impact on the ecosystem and push these conditions out of bounds. Tropical plants and 
animals will therefore be more stressed and because the species used to live within such 
narrow fluctuations they will not be able to adapt quickly enough to unprecedented and rapid 
changes in climate. As the main part of the world’s species live in the tropics, the global 
biodiversity will be affected hard (Mora et al. 2013:183). The climate is a primary driver of 
biological processes and affects several aspects of human life. Because of this, climate change 
could cause large potentially impacts on ecological systems and human societies. The tropical 
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zone is often among low-income countries and limited governmental capacity to respond to the 
impacts of climate change (Mora et al. 2013:183-184).     
 
 
5.2.3.1.2 Climate change in the Horn region. 
 
A regional climate model, to estimate the future pathway of African climate, show a prominent 
surface heating and a weakening of the hydrological cycle over most tropical Africa, which 
results in enhanced heat stress and extended dry spells. It turns out that land use changes are 
primarily responsible for the simulated climate response (Paeth et al. 2008:114-115). 
 
Precipitation: 
During the last decade there have been done several studies on trends in precipitation at the 
Horn of East Africa. Since the end of the 1990’s eastern Africa has experienced more frequent 
boreal spring dry events. The series of March-May dry events occurring in 2007, 2008, 2009, 
2011 and 2012 added to climatic stresses (Funk et al. 2013:45).    
 
 
Figure 1: Interannual rainfall average over the Horn region during the two wet-seasons. (a) March-May 
and (b) October-December. GPCP, ECHAM and GPCC indicates different measurements.(Liebmann et al 
2014: 8636). 
 
Observations of precipitation during the period from 1979 to 2012, at the eastern Horn of Africa, 
have been analyzed and show a pronounced decrease of the long wet season (March-May) 
through the last 34 years. In contrast the shorter wet season during October-December (OND) 
experience a recent increase in rainfall, though this trend is rather weak (Liebmann et al. 2014: 
8641).   As the March-May spring wet season is the period when the region receives the largest 
fraction of its total annual rainfall the weak trend of an increase in rainfall during OND doesn’t 
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help much on total annual rainfall. More research would need to be done in order to answer the 
question on whether or not the greenhouse effect will lead to a drier or wetter climate in the 
region in the future (Lyon. 2014: 7972; Liebmann et al. 2014:8643).  But the observed decrease 
in precipitation during more than 34 years gives an impression and have had large impacts in 
the region as already showed. It is projected that the observed proportion of precipitation falling 
in heavy rainfall events will occur more often in the future. This will result in increased rainfall 
variability (Funk et al. 2013:45). 
 
Temperature  
Kenya has experienced a rise in temperature by 1 ºC over the past 50 years. The country is 
thereby warming at a rate of about 1.5 times the global average (Schilling et al 2014: 6). 
Studies, where measures combined with models for the period 1961-2040, shows a consistent 
warming trend with increasing positive surface temperature anomalies over the Horn of Africa 
(do also see table 2 in chapter 6.1).  For the future the temperature is projected to warm 
between 1 and 2 ºC by the middle of the 21 st century, particularly during the spring wet season 
and the following summer dry season. The temperature projections also shows an significant 
increase of the numbers of days with minimum and maximum temperatures to be warmer than 2 
ºC above the 1981-2000 average, by the middle and the end of the 21st century (Anyah & Qiu. 
2011:360-61).    
Other studies predict a rise in temperature in Kenya up to 2.8  ºC until 2060 and up to 4.5 ºC 
until 2090 (Schilling et al 2014: 8).  
 
 
 
 
5.2.4 Impacts by climate change 
 
The projected trend of less reliable and extreme precipitation events and rising temperatures 
are likely to increase the amount of droughts and floods in Kenya. The frequency of droughts 
has increased with a factor of about 1.5 during the last 10 years compared with the events 
during the last 100 years. According to local pastoralist and farmers, droughts used to occur 
every nine or ten years. Now they experience droughts every two or three years (Schilling et al 
2014: 8).  In some regions, rainfall deficits of more than 30 % led to crop failures and poor 
pasture conditions (Funk et al. 2013:45).  
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The dryer climate has also resulted in a reduction in the inflow from the Omo River to Lake 
Turkana and has led to a reduction of the smaller portion that the lake receive directly from 
precipitation. Increasing temperature leads to an increased evaporation, which adds to a larger 
deficit of water in the soil, rivers and lakes (Anyah & Qiu 201: 360-61).   
 
 
Figure 2: Lake Turkana Water Balance Model (Avery 2013: 40) 
 
Satellite images of the northern part of Lake Turkana and the Omo River by year 1973 and 2011 
can  be seen in appendix 1. As the photos show the area of the lake has decreased since 1973.  
 
5.2.5 Projects of water resources in the Omo River Valley 
As described above Lake Turkana depends on the inflow from the Omo River. In 1996, Ethiopia 
presented a master plan for the development of the Omo Valley Basin, which included building 
a hydropower dam on the Omo River and an establishment of commercial irrigation farming in 
the lower Omo Valley (Avery. 2013: 25 ).  
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5.2.5.1 Hydropower dam at the Omo River. 
 
The Omo River contributes approximately 90 percent of the inflow to Lake Turkana and the 
Omo Basin is Ethiopia’s second largest river system. At the Omo River, two hydropower dams 
have already been constructed and is producing electric power (Gibe I: 184 MW; Gibe II: 420 
MW). A larger hydropower project is currently under construction with the purpose to produce 
1870 MW. Thus in 2006 Ethiopia started building a 243 m high dam on the Omo River (Gibe III 
Dam), about 600 km upstream from Lake Turkana. The Dam will create a huge storage lake 
upstream Omo River (Avery. 2012:1-16). The dam is planned to be finish by 2015 and maybe to 
begin producing electric power already in 2015. When the dam is established, the filling of the 
reservoir will begin. During the first years about 60-70 percent of the Omo River inflow will be 
captured behind the Dam, as the water level has to rise to a certain elevation before the water 
can be discharged through the power tunnel. Within the filling period the outlet of water 
downstream the dam will be markedly reduced (approximately 25 – 100 m3 /s). After filling the 
reservoir the daily flows will fluctuate between minimum flow and the turbine discharge (again 
25 – 100 m3 /s) (Fong. 2015:1-2). The Gibe III Dam is Ethiopia’s largest investment project and 
the largest hydropower project in Sub-Saharan Africa. The electricity from the hydropower 
project is planned both to be for domestic use and for export, and as such a grid connection 
between Kenya and Ethiopia is planned. The financing of Gibe III will be supported by several 
foreign donors (International Rivers, 2009: 1-3). In addition two more hydro-power project is in 
the study phase, the Gibe IV of 1472 MW and Gibe V of 560 MW (Avery. 2012: 16).      
 
 
5.2.5.2 Commercial irrigation projects 
 
The construction of the Gibe III dam on the Omo River is very much connected to another 
project involving water from the Omo River. As the dam will regulate floods and raise the dry 
season´s flow it is possible to establish commercial irrigated agricultural plantations in the lower 
Omo River Basin. Thus, in advance of completing the Gibe III dam, the constructions of the 
Kuraz Sugar plantations (area: 161,285 hectares) and connected sugar processing factories 
and resettlement villages (additional area of 47,370 hectares) has been started. The irrigation of 
the plantations and accompanying activities will require approximately 50 percent of the Omo 
River inflow and thereby affect the downstream areas.  As a 500 m long low earthen dam is 
constructed about 200 km downstream of the Gibe III dam to funnel water into an irrigation 
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canal, it blocks the rivers flow downstream and instead inundate riverbanks and villages 
upstream. This especially affects low-lying grazing areas (Fong. 2015:2). As described further in 
chapter 5.3.4 the Kuraz Sugar plantation also resulted in deletions from two national parks and 
one Wildlife Reserve in the lower Omo Valley (Avery. 2012:4).   
 
Map 7: Planned irrigation development in lower Omo River, 2011 (Avery 2013: 27) 
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5.2.5.3 The impact of the Hydropower- and irrigation project in The Omo Valley and Lake 
Turkana. 
It has been forecasted that the development of Omo-Gibe hydropower, by the year 2014, will 
result in a reduction of the Omo River inflow and that it will lead to a significant and permanent 
drop in Lake Turkanas water-level of 10-12 meters. This is due to leakages to the underground 
of water from the storage lake, which the dam has created.   The irrigation project will require a 
reduction of the Omo River's inflow to Lake Turkana with between 28.2 percent and more than 
40 percent.  The reduced inflow of water to Lake Turkana alone from these projects will cause a 
permanent drop in the lake's water-level with up to 22 meters from its current level, depending 
on the irrigation efficiency.  As the average depth of the lake is approximately 30 meters this will 
have a significant impact on the lake in many ways.    A 13 meter lake level drop will mean a 
reduction of the lake's volume to 59 percent of its current volume. As the lake has no outlet the 
reduced volume will lead to a further increase in the waters salinity. The huge volume reduction 
will also reduce the habitat for fish and other animals and hence the available biomass. As an 
example from the past the falling lake level between year 1975 and 1988 resulted in a reduction 
of the lakes pelagic fish with 70 % (Avery. 2012:  4-6).  
  
Flow variations on the Omo River, as a result of variation in precipitation, are natural events that 
are important to the livelihoods for communities at the river banks and the river's ecosystem. 
The controlled outlet from the hydropower station will equalize these natural flow variations and 
floods.  A controlled 10-days flood release during September have been proposed to 
compensate. Stakeholders and independent consultants have criticized this planned flood, 
though, as unsubstantiated or not likely to happen in reality due to the high cost (Fong. 2015: 1-
2). 
 
 
5.2.6. Conservation of nature 
 
In the area around Lake Turkana and in the Omo Valley there are several national parks and 
wildlife reserves. Some of these national parks serve as home for agro-pastoralists.  
At the lake, the Lake Turkana National Parks are constituted of three different parks: Sibioi 
National Park (on the lake's eastern shore), the South Island and the Central Island National 
Park (both lie in the lake). The three national parks have a total area of 161,485 ha of which the 
far largest is Sibiori National Park covering 157,085 ha. These parks are on UNESCO’s list of 
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World Heritage according to their unique flora and fauna and to unique geo-morphological 
features with fossil deposits in the sediments including human and pre-human fossils of great 
importance to the research in human origins (UNESCO, 2015).  To facilitate fieldwork, primary 
for research in human prehistory and related earth and natural science studies, two field centers 
was established in the Turkana basin (TBI-Turkwel and TBI-Ileret) (Martin et al, 2011). 
  
The lower Omo Valley is also internationally recognized for its unique cultural and ecological 
landscape. The area contains the three projected areas: the Omo and Mago National Parks and 
the Tama Wildlife reserve. Two national parks are listed as World Heritage sites by UNESCO 
(Avery. 2012).   
By conservation and enrollment to lists for projected areas, there may follow restrictions on 
activities in the area for the local people. On the other hand the projection of nature is not 
always guaranteed as, for example, seen from the irrigation project at the Omo River, where 
The Kuraz plantation and factories in lower Omo Valley will cover 175,000 ha. This is mainly in 
areas of the Omo and Mago National Parks, and the Tama Wildlife Reserve, see map 7 (Avery. 
2012).    
 
 
5.2.7 Infrastructure, wind power, oil and freshwater 
 
Derived by exploration of oil in the area the Kenyan government has now plans of investing in 
infrastructure in this remote area, currently a road from Lamu to South Sudan, even though oil 
production is a long way off (Avery, 2013). Another project that might add to development of 
infrastructure in the area is the planned Lake Turkana Wind Power Project. The windfarm will 
cover approximately 16,000 ha and will consist of 365 wind turbines delivered by Danish Vestas 
in 2017 (African Climate 2013).  A huge deep paleo freshwater lake, at the same size as Lake 
Turkana, has recently been found west of Lake Turkana (Avery, 2013).     
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5.2.8 Impacts on people by changes in environment and water-resources 
 
Kenya and thereby the Turkana area is characterized as vulnerable to climate change. The 
increase in temperatures and rainfall variability are likely to increase the frequency and duration 
of drought and floods. This will have an effect on pastures, agriculture and the conditions in 
Lake Turkana (Schilling et al 2014: 17).   In the Turkana area, fish has since the 1960s been an 
important protein source for pastoralist and has provided to an alternative livelihood in a 
vulnerable area with challenges of food security. The lowering of Lake Turkana, alternation in 
other conditions by climate change, irrigation and projects like Gibe III are changing and limiting 
factors for the lake’s  ecology and fish-production, which might have a serious effect on the 
Turkana fisheries and thereby have serious socioeconomic consequences. In addition the 
lowering of the lake’s level and change in water quality (eg. increase in salinity) will lead to a 
reduction of water as a resource for people and livestock  (Avery 2013).   
 
The financing of Gibe III will be supported by several foreign donors (International Rivers, 2009: 
1-3). The Omo Basin Master Plan, which is financed by the African Development Bank, did not 
include consultations with Kenyan stakeholder and threats to Lake Turkana’s fisheries were not 
taken serious or into acount. Also, the World Bank did downplay the impact by these projects on 
the Turkana area and it’s people, without making any prior ecological and socio-economic 
studies (Avery 2013: 49-50).  
 
The Omo Valley Basin has a population of 14 million people and around Lake Turkana about 
one million people live. The eviction of local people from their traditional lands by the authorities 
for transferring 445,500 ha of land in the lower Omo to commercial farmer coming outside of the 
area, has made human rights organisations claim that this was a land-grab without adequate 
compensation . The national parks in the lower Omo Valley are home for approximately 200,000 
agro-pastoralists, including unique and traditional ethnic groups of which the majority practice 
flood-retreat agriculture on the banks of the Omo River and raise cattle where the annual 
flooding by the river provides important grazing areas.  The area has earlier on been very 
isolated and these people have little experience with commercial/industrial farming (Avery 2013) 
.    
The developments in the Turkana area like e.g. infrastructure and freshwater resources could 
be to the benefit of the local people if managed properly. In the opposite case it could increase 
pressure on the already impoverished local people and wildlife. The freshwater underground 
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lake might give real opportunities but as the quality of the water is uncertain and the recharge of 
the aquifer is weak it might bring unrealistic expectations (Avery. 2013).  
The coming windmill farm might bring socio-economic benefits and as an innovative solution to 
Africa’s energy dilemma and climate change response, but it is also foreseen that they will have 
an effect on the environment and the people living in the area, for example, by loss of habitat 
and potential effect on flora and fauna, mortality of birds (by collisions with the turbines) soil 
erosion and siltation of the lake, increased noise levels and disturbance to livestock. An 
environmental and social management/monitoring plan is carried out in order to ensure that any 
of the changes that the project brings are effectively recorded and managed ( African Climate 
2013).     
 
 
5.3. Turkana Area. Government 
  
Comprehending the circumstance of the nomads in eastern Africa requires an overview of the 
governance-umbrella under which they abide.  It is imperative to understand the role of the 
central and local government, and how they influence activities, and the conflicts between the 
nomadic tribes in the Arid and Semi-Arid Land (ASAL) region.  The Turkana pastoral tribes 
dwell, geographically (North West) and politically, under the jurisdiction of Kenya. It is important 
to indicate that among other responsibilities, there are four important functions of any 
government; (a.) to make policies, (b.) to create binding rules, (c.) to enforce the rules, and (d.) 
to straighten out disputes arising from the rules created (Omiti et al., 2002); however, the 
Turkana people have been socio-economically marginalized and poverty is prevalent (Scheffran 
et al., 2014). Kenya practices a modern form of governance, a presidential representative 
democratic republic, having both central and local governments with a three-tier structure; 
consisting of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. However, Kenya also practices an 
informal (traditional) system of government, a parallel local government that is subordinate to 
the central government, which guides the citizens at the rural and peripheral areas. The 
pastoralists and the majority of the agro-pastoral communities live in the rural peripheral 
(Outskirts) area of Kenya. The Turkana pastoral society is known for practicing an informal 
system of government. A council of elders, whose responsibilities include addressing various 
facets of social life, guides the communities using customary laws. Identically, the nomads have 
a higher respect for rules of the elders, and are (the rules) more binding to the society members 
that those set by the federal government (OAU-IBAR, 1999; in Omiti et al., 2002). The Turkana 
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tribes are socially organized primarily through nuclear family (awi) units, and group of families 
under a recognized leader (adakar). Other social organizations are in forms of clans (emachar), 
age group, sections (ekitela), and alternations (Akabwai, 1992). Even though the official political 
leadership and order of authority among the Turkana tribes is still under debate by scholars, 
Apthorpe (1986) cited by Akabwai (1992) insist that there is an effective local leadership system 
at play. For instance, in the 1970s, without the aid of the Kenyan and Ugandan government, the 
chiefs of Turkana and Karamojong negotiated a treaty of amity (Akabwai, 1992). 
Notwithstanding, recently there has been a collapse of the customary structure of governance in 
the ASAL area (OAU-IBAR, 1999; in Omiti et al., 2002). 
  
Through public policy the Turkana tribes have been neglected. The disregard of the Turkana 
nomads is not a recent manifestation, and dates back to the colonial era in Kenya. During the 
colonial time, northern and eastern (pastoral areas) Kenya were regarded as “closed district” 
due to the physical (extreme aridity) and social (habitation by aggressive ethnic groups) 
characteristics of the area (Braaksma, 1994; in Omiti et al. 2002). The colonial administration 
restricted movement to and from these closed districts, and the areas were classified as liability-
areas with no significant contribution to the national economy (Braaksma, 1994; in Omiti et al., 
2002). Consequently, no calculated efforts were made to invest in these areas, and the only 
developments considered were focused on preserving the culture of the community and 
preserving security (Omiti et al. 2002). Studies indicate a total absence of central government 
representatives in the ASAL area. Certainly, the issue of government neglect in the ASAL area 
of Kenya is further intensified as Omiti et al. (2002) puts it that “There has been minimal 
presence of law-enforcement agents, particularly the police and the judiciary, in the ASAL (Arid 
and Semi-Arid Land) areas.” 
  
Furthermore, besides the incompetence of the authorities at the local level, the Kenyan central 
government provides inadequate funding for the local authorities; to empower them with the 
abilities required to engage in minimal development activities in their areas of jurisdiction, 
including the ASAL areas. Those (civil servants) that are posted to the pastoral areas are not so 
enthusiastic about their responsibilities in the area. The government bureaucracy has not 
improved, and as a result, the civil servants (usually from the pastoral areas) are not eager to 
undertake deliberate long-term planning to advocate development in the ASALS, unfortunately 
they refer to these (HMPL – High and Medium Potential Lands) areas as “punishment stations” 
or hardship areas”. Consequently, the local authorities have resulted in exploiting the nomads 
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through rent-seeking activities, principally through allocation of commercial plots, issuance of 
trade licenses, and stock movement permits (Omiti et al., 2002).  The Turkana people encounter 
both political and economic marginalization, this has resulted in low infrastructural development 
in education, roads, health, water, power, telecommunication and marketing services. The 
private sector has been discouraged from investing in the ASAL areas due to the absence of 
infrastructure in the region. According to RWA International (2000), the level of literacy in the 
nomadic area is 3% compared to the national average of 79.3%, only half of the entire Turkana 
people have access to healthcare, studies suggests that the other 50% are either too far away 
or unable to afford healthcare (Omiti et al., 2000). Diverse arguments have been put forward to 
analyze the low enthusiasm in investing in pastoral education, (i.) The cost of delivering 
education services to sparsely populated and remote areas is too high and outweigh the 
benefits; (ii.) Pastoralists are unable to pay for education and frequently too mobile; (iii.) The 
pastoral people attach little value to formal education due to socio-cultural factors; and (iv.) 
protracted conflicts. However, the pastoralist have been know to value education and have 
created traditional education practice that are tailored to their way of life, an example is the 
“Madrassa” (a mobile Koranic school) which is well attended by students, and runs in the 
morning and evening to allow for children also participate in herding activities. Lack of formal 
education limits the ability of the pastoralist to gain employment in other sectors, thus making 
pastoralism the only viable livelihood.  
 
The failure, of the Kenyan government, to guard institutions against poor administration and 
development of pastoralism-biased policies has affected the Turkana people and has hindered 
sustainable livestock production. Institutional failure in the Turkana area is illustrated through 
social and political marginalization, social conflicts, economic stagnation and destitution (Omiti 
et al., 2002). At this point, it is judicious to restate what governance entails, and as Nwabuzor 
and Mueller (1985) puts it, a governance structure enforces and protects institutions and the 
institutions create the governance structures. Therefore, both concepts are related and must 
work synergistically to strengthen each other. The enforcement of institutions are guided by 
principles. 
  
The policies that govern pastoral areas are created through formal and informal (traditional) 
institutions. Omiti and Irungu (2002) find that institutional failure and poor governance are 
connected, when evaluating pastoralism and pastoral economy performance, in Kenya. Within 
the formal institutions, there are laws set out by the government, which have had an adverse 
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impact on the pastoral areas including the Turkana area; examples of such laws are the “Land 
laws”, and “Anti-Corruption Efforts”. 
 
Land laws 
Since independence in 1963 Kenya has had a dualistic system of land law. The first system was 
adopted from their colonial rulers (The British), and the second is the customary land law 
system, which is based on the practices of the various Kenyan tribes. All pastoral lands are 
classified to be under communal ownership based on the Land Act (Cap 280) and customary 
land law controls the use of such communal land. The entire members of a given pastoral 
community have equal access rights to land utilization; consequently no individual can buy, own 
or alienate the land (Jackson, 1992; in Omiti and Orunu. 2002). The rights of access to land in 
pastoral communities are controlled by social factors, including ethnicity, kinship, status and 
historically developed residence due to alliance, collaboration and competition between groups 
(Hesse and Trench, 2000; in Omiti and Irungu, 2002). Besides the tragedy of the common 
(Where lands are held in common, individual herders will have low incentive to reduce the 
number of animals that graze on that land, since it is the principal motive of the pastoralist to 
have as many livestock as possible. Consequently, overstocking will result in overgrazing 
problems that are often associated with rivalry and non-excludability of grazing areas), 
institutional failure allows for the extraction of private benefits from such public goods, leading to 
land degradation and desertification. The Land Act have failed to clearly define property rights in 
pastoral areas, and thus a loop hole persists that gives the elite, with political and economic 
clout, an incentive to conspire with government officials to give out enormous expanse of 
communal land for private use (Ntimama, 2002; in Omiti and Urugu 2002), this land grabbing 
culture continually reduces the land resources available for use by pastoral communities, 
particularly dry season grazing areas. This has increased the pressure between new 
landowners and pastoralists (Omiti and Irungu, 2002). Although this may be true, most recently 
the government of Kenya has kicked of a comprehensive land reform in tune with other political 
and economical reforms, a land commission (Njonjo Commission) has been charged with the 
responsibility of soliciting views of the citizenry regarding the nature of land policies they would 
rather have; the definite kind of land reform to be recommended by the commission is yet to be 
known and it is not clear whether or not the reforms will have a positive impact on pastoral 
societies. 
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Anti-corruption efforts 
Corruption comes to play in pastoral societies in Kenya during trade license acquisition, 
payment of inflated export fees and utilization of tax collected from livestock markets. In 
numerous unreported cases, livestock traders have been subjected to mandatory bribe payment 
to law enforcement officers on their way to the market place. Such rent-seeking activities have 
impacted livestock transaction costs. Unfortunately, even though corruption has come to be a 
crucial factor in the hindrance of Kenya’s economic development, no law has been legislated to 
curb it. Furthermore, Kenya’s dream of a corrupt-free society will take a long time to come 
through as the Parliament failed to pass the KACA (Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority) bill. 
 
Informal institution 
Informal institutions are mostly cultural and are passed on to generations as beliefs, norms, 
values and attitudes. These laid back systems guide social interactions, as well as define and 
protect culturally approved property rights. Within pastoral societies, it is crucial to examine the 
beliefs that guide pastoralists’ attitude towards livestock and see how these factors influence 
decision making and whether or not, they play a role in onset of conflicts within the societies. 
Three determinants affect how pastoralists view livestock. The first is conservatism, the second 
is the cattle-culture complex and the third is the interaction between pastoralists and cultivators 
(Omiti and Orungu, 2002). 
  
Conservatism and the preservation of livestock is largely influenced by traditional and cultural 
beliefs. Pastoralists are known for reluctance to dispose livestock, even when it is in their best 
interest. Traditionally, it is considered to be depletion of herds when an animal is sold off, and 
this attitude increases the animal mortality rate during times of drought (Omiti and Orungu 
2002). The pastoralists lack market-oriented livestock production, hence, livestock are reared 
not necessarily for profit but mainly for socio-cultural and subsistence purposes; the poor trade 
infrastructure in the pastoral areas can also be considered as an influencing factor. 
Conservatism indicates the reluctance of the pastoralists to embrace change, and or consider 
arable agriculture on the side while rearing their livestock. 
  
Cattle-Culture Complex depicts how livestock is regarded as more than an economic asset. 
Livestock is part of almost all social interactions and can be seen as a form of insurance (social) 
against liabilities and emergencies. Livestock also serve spiritual, emotional and social needs of 
the pastoralists. As Soper (1986) puts it, the nomads affirm that all animals on earth, regardless 
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of who owns it right now, are rightfully theirs and see no botheration taking them by force. The 
pastoralists are willing to lay down their lives in pursuit of this belief (Soper, 1986; in Omiti and 
Orungu 2002). 
  
Traditional institutions influence the socio-economic relationship between the pastoralists and 
cultivators. A symbiotic relationship comes to play in that the pastoralists offer livestock and 
livestock products (for example meat, milk, manure) in exchange for grain, straw and cash. In 
some cases, pastoralists and cultivators share markets and in some instances they intermarry. 
Most recently, both groups have been strained by partisan politics and the traditional norms and 
values have continued to erode consequently. 
 
5.4. Turkana Area. Social organization.  
 
5.4.1. Historical perspective 
 
Various groups of pastoralists inhabited the Turkana area, preceding the eighteenth century. 
These groups include the Rendille, the Samburu and the Merille (called the Dessenech today). 
The Turkana tribe entered the region in two main stages. First stage took place in the second 
half of the 18th century. Hereafter, the second stage was in the middle of the 19th century. The 
Turkana tribe increased their territory in all directions, in this period from second half of 18th 
century and middle of 19th century, by: “displacing the Toposa, the Dongiro (Inyangatom) and 
the Dassanech in the north; the Dodoth (Dodos) and the Karimojong in the west; the Pokot in 
the south and the Samburu in the southeast.” (Oba:3). This occurred after the Turkana tribe had 
separated with their “brothers”, the Jie, which is a group that now lives in Uganda. 
So, the Turkana tribe conquered other pastoral groups and their lands during the 19th century. It 
is described, by Oba, that there are these two main reasons for why these conquests occurred; 
the first reason is that the Turkana people were in a relatively strong military and economic 
position compared to their neighbours after the rinderpest disaster in 1880s. The reason that the 
Turkana people were in this position was that they were isolated from this rinderpest disaster in 
1880s. The second reason is that, because of the favourable conditions, the Turkana population 
was expanding in this period and that they therefore needed a higher amount of grazing land 
(Oba:3). It is generally described, by Schilling et al. (2012), that the pastoral communities in 
north-western Kenya have a long history of conflicts. (Schilling et al. 2012:2) 
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5.4.2. Turkana tribe. 
Geographical overview. 
The following 3 maps show the Turkana area from different angles and with different 
informations about the area.  
Map 8. Location of the study area in Kenya. (Schilling et al. 2012:2) 
The Turkana area is illustrated in this map, along with the West Pokot area. This map also 
illustrates the study area that is used for table 1. 
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Map 9.  Turkana sections back from 1951 (McCabe. 2004:55) 
This map shows Turkana sections back from 1951. 
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Map 10. Borderland between northern Kenya, southwestern Ethiopia and southeast Sudan, and the tribes 
in the area. (Powers. 2011:1) 
 
This maps shows a section of the borderland between northern Kenya, southwestern Ethiopia 
and southeast Sudan. The Omo river is also shown in the map. The south western part of the 
map is the northern part of the Turkana area. 
 
The Turkana tribes.  
Firstly, will follow an outlook and description on the Turkana tribe. There are twenty-nine clans 
among the Turkana tribe. Each clan is defined as exogamous, which means that they are not 
allowed to marry within that given clan. It is estimated that there are 200000 Turkana people 
(Fratkin. 2001:3). The membership of each clan is symbolized by a brand, which appears on all 
the camels and cattle of the clan members (McCabe. 2004:56) The social organization of the 
Turkana tribe is based on the awi, which consist of a man, his wives, their children and usually 
also of a number of other so-called dependent women. The dependent woman is often a close 
relative to the awi, who has either become so poor that her husband was not able to take care 
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of her anymore or lost her husband. It is described that most of the awis have herds and flocks 
of camels, donkeys, cattle, goats and/or sheep. The composition of the herds and flocks that 
every awi has is though different according to these aspects: “location, wealth of the herd 
owner, number and types of animals inherited, and the individual preference for certain species 
by the herd owner” (McCabe. 2004:53). All Turkana men are supposed to go through a 
ceremony called asapan before they get married. Today, described in 2004 by McCabe (2004), 
the ceremony is though often held in years after the marriage took place. At the asapan 
ceremony, the young man abandons material objects that is identified with his youth and gets 
adult status. These items identified with his youth are: “replaced by his ´asapan father´, a man 
chosen to help the young man become a responsible adult member of the community” 
(McCabe. 2004:58). It is defined that the relationship between the young man and his asapan 
father remains very important, even though the initiation ceremony, asapan, seems to be less 
important today, compared to the past (McCabe. 2004:59). Most of the herd owners are living 
and travelling with other herd owners. Each herd joins normally with two to five other herds and 
their families. This forms what is described as a large awi or awi apolon. The composition of 
each awi apolon is though changing frequently. New awis join and other leaves the awi apolon. 
The herding responsibilities, and periodically also food, are often shared within these awis 
apolon units (McCabe. 2004:53). There are though differences between the wet season and the 
rest of the year. It is defined that each herd owner usually has a home area or ere, and that they 
normally return to this specific area in the wet season. The herd owner does, though, not own 
legal rights to grazing the given area. This is although he might own wells in that area (McCabe. 
2004:53). The Turkana people keep these different kind of livestock types; cattle (Zebu), 
donkeys, sheep, goats and camels. It is defined, by Schilling et al (2012), that these livestock 
types plays a multiple economic, social and religious roles in the pastoral livelihoods. They 
provide; “a regular source of food in the form of milk, meat and blood for household members, 
cash income to pay for cereals, education, healthcare and other services” (Schilling et al. 
2012:2). The livestock is also essential for security against disease and drought, and for 
payment of dowry. It is also a symbol of prosperity and prestige (Schilling et al. 2012:2). The 
different awis also congregate into temporary associations, during the wet season. These 
associations are called adakars, and consist of up to three thousand people during good years. 
The people within each adakars stay together as long as there is enough forage and water 
resources (McCabe. 2004:54). A new form of social group emerged in 1995 to 1996, called 
arum-rum. This group consists of many herd owners, such as in awi apolons, but this group is 
under the leadership of a single man. The young men in the arum-run group were heavily armed 
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and concentrically built thorn fences were built. This was, according to what McCabe (2004) 
was told: “a response to the especially heavy attacks from the Pokot that occurred in the early 
and mid-1990s” (McCabe. 2004:54) 
 
5.4.3. Turkana tribe conflicts.  
 
The following two part chapters will describe two specific conflicts around the Turkana area. 
One being the conflict between the Turkana tribe and the Merille (Daasanach) tribe in the 
northern part of the Turkana area. The second being the conflict between the Turkana tribe and 
the Pokot in the south western part of the Turkana area.  
 
5.4.3.1. The Turkana tribe and the Merille (Daasanach) tribe conflict 
 
Thousands of Merille people live along lake Turkana, in the northwest of Kenya. While, most of 
the Merille people live in the southern part of Ethiopia. It is described that the livelihood of the 
Merille people depends on: “pastoralism, flood-plain and fishing around the Omo River”(Powers. 
2011:1). So, the annual flooding from the Omo river is something that the Merille people depend 
on. The fact that both the Turkana and Merille tribe are nomadic has been the main reason why 
these groups have crashed over territorial claims in the past. This is since that they both need to 
constantly migrate to other areas, in order to find more water resource and better lands 
(Powers. 2011:1).  
The following map shows the borderland between Kenya, South Sudan and Ethiopia. The 
different tribes and their geographical position is also illustrated. It also shows the geographical 
placement of the Merille (Daasanach) tribe.  
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Map 10. Borderland between northern Kenya, southwestern Ethiopia and southeast Sudan, and the tribes 
in the area. (Powers. 2011:1) 
 
5.4.3.2 The Turkana and Pokot conflict. 
 
The conflicts between the Turkana tribes and the Pokot tribes have existed for many years. 
Accordingly, respondents from the area were not able to recall a year without raiding and 
conflicts. The respondents were from both the Turkana tribes and the Pokot tribes. The study, 
which is based on interviews of these respondents, was carried out between September 2008 
and December 2011. The respondents from the study commonly agreed on that the conflict and 
the amount of raids have escalated in recent years. Other studies have also reported that the 
conflict between the Turkana and the Pokot has increased in recent years (Schilling et al. 
2012:6) 
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5.4.4. Raiding. 
 
Ecology is an important factor in understanding how the Turkana people use their land. A 
second force, which is also important for the way in which the Turkana people use their land, is 
defined as being: “raiding, violence and the threat of raiding” (McCabe. 2004:81). McCabe 
(2004) explains that: “Among the Turkana, it is difficult to underestimate the degree to which 
raiding and violence influence people´s lives” (McCabe. 2004:89).The general objective of the 
raids is to destroy enemies and to capture livestock (McCabe. 2004:89). It is defined that raiding 
is used as a strategy to restock cattle. There are also other strategies to restock cattle, such as 
bride wealth and inheritance. As described: “Of the possible customary strategies employed to 
restock cattle, the Turkana rank raiding as the third most attractive option. The second is bride 
wealth and the first, inheritance” (Meier et al.:221) 
It is, though, important to distinguish between theft and raid of livestock. The first, of these two, 
includes actions that are made by individual on their own, which means that they do their 
actions without approval from elders. Whereas, raiding is considered very different and 
significantly more legitimate than theft. Raiding is described to be correlated with pastoral 
traditions and traditionally to be based on established norms and principles. It is, though, also 
described that cattle raiding has been transformed from a cultural practice that included some 
important livelihood-improving functions, to a more predatory practice (Meier et al.:718).  A herd 
owner, and therefore also an awi, could lose all their livestocks because of raiding. A member 
within the awi could be seriously inquired or even getting killed. These raid can even occur in 
time of relative peace. So, this is a persistent topic among the men and women (McCabe. 
2004:89). 
 
Schilling et al. (2012), did investigate the motives for raiding among Turkana and Pokot people. 
The investigation is based on interviews conducted in September and November 2011 (Schilling 
et al. 2012:7). The people interviewed were asked about the primary and secondary reason for 
raiding. The results look as following:  
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Table 1. Motives for raiding as stated by Turkana and Pokot raiders (Schilling et al. 2012:7) 
 
This investigation provides an understanding of the motives for raiding. It is noticeable that 78 
percent of Turkana people said that hunger was the primary motive for raiding. Whereas, none 
of the Pokot people said that hunger was the primary motive for raiding. Schilling et al. (2012) 
does, however, explain that the west Pokot area had received above average rainfall in the 
period of the interviews. While, the long rain periods in March and May in the Turkana area had 
completely failed that year. This means that there was a difference in the resource availability 
between the Turkana people and Pokot people at the time of the interviews, in those specific 
areas (Schilling et al. 2012:7). That the primary motive for raiding among Turkana people is 
hunger can be exemplified in these words from a Turkana raider: “I bring [livestock] or I die” 
(Schilling et al. 2012:7). It can therefore be observed from this table 1 that the motives of raiding 
should be seen as changing according to some factors, such as the resource availability.  
 
What is the total amount of raids per year in the Turkana area? The following figure, figure 3, 
illustrates the amount of raids per year between the Turkana and Pokot people. The figure does 
show a significant change between the years. For example, the amount of raids did increase 
around 400 percent from 2008 to 2009, from around 30-40 organized raids in 2008 to around 
180 organized raids in 2009.  
There has been around 305 organized raids in the period from 2006 to 2009 (70 in 2006, 25 in 
2007, 30 in 2008, 180 in 2009). There has been around 650 human deaths in the same period 
(150 in 2006, 110 in 2007, 115 in 2008, 275 in 2009). This means that there has been around 
2,13 human deaths per raid in this period. A number that illustrates how dangerous the raids 
were in this period in this area.  
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Figure 3. Number of raids and raid-related deaths in Turkana and Pokot between 2006 and 2009. 
(Schilling et al. 2012: 6)  
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The following map shows the amount of raids compared to different areas in the Turkana area. 
 
 
 
Map 11. Research area and number of raids in Turkana between 2006 and 2009 (Schilling et al 2014: 4) 
 
It is noticeable to see that some areas have only had between 1 to 5 raids in this period from 
2006 to 2009. Whereas, there is another area that has had more than 40 raids in the same 
period. It can be clearly concluded, based on this map, that the amount of raids in the Turkana 
area is not equal in all parts of the area.  
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5.4.4.1. Influence. Guns, Globalism, Commercial raiding. 
 
It is specified, by social scientists, who have investigated this matter for the last decade, that 
colonialism, global markets and political agendas have influenced the local life and social 
practices for the pastoralist people around the Turkana area. This counts for even the remote 
places, where people appear to be living according to what is described as: ”stereotypically 
traditional” (McCabe. 2004:91). 
The connection between the outside world and the people living in the Turkana area, the 
Turkana people included, has been maintained by guns in a historical perspective. This 
availability of guns, in the Turkana area, has clearly affected the way the people in the Turkana 
area use their lands. This access to guns and modern weapons in general should be considered 
in order to comprehend and understand violence and raiding in the Turkana area (McCabe. 
2004:92). It is also argued, by Mwaura and Schneidl (2002), that this general availability of guns 
has “altered the cultural foundations of many communities - erosion of traditional conflict-
resolution mechanisms in the face of arms-bearing youth being one of the most significant 
examples” (Meier et al.:719). This indicates that this availability of guns has changed cultural 
foundations of the pastoral tribes.  
It is defined that a commercialization of raiding has occurred in modern days. This is seen, for 
example, when young men in the pastoral groups are armed and paid by wealthy and powerful 
people, which can in some cases include livestock traders and arms dealers, to carry out raids 
for them. Mwaura and Schmeidl (2002), has mentioned and described this emerging 
phenomena of commercialization of raiding as: “livestock warlord rivalry” (Meier et al. 
2007:719). They also described that this happen particularly in the Pokot and Turkana 
communities. This commercialization of raiding has even led local area experts to conclude this: 
“commercial raiding is a more important factor contributing to violence than ecological pressure” 
(Meier et al. 2007:720). Another source does, though, indicate a difference between the West 
Pokot area and what they define as the Turkana area, when it comes to commercial raiding. 
This source specifies that: “In Turkana there is a little indication of commercialised raiding” 
(Scheffran. 2014:377). Whereas, “parts of the pastoral production system in West Pokot are 
integrated into wider market economy through ´commercialised raids  ´ in which livestock is 
stolen and then sold on the market instead of kept to restore own herds” (Scheffran. 2014:377). 
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5.5. Turkana area - Demographics 
 
Even though there is an abundance of studies and research on pastoral issues, there are few 
studies with quantitative data dedicated to the population demographic structure of pastoral 
societies. A report by the Overseas Development Institute (2010) through the Regional Pastoral 
Livelihoods Advocacy Project (REGLAP) finds that, a major constraint in finding information 
about pastoral society demographic information is the lack of data on pastoralist. Even more, 
where data on demography was available, pastoralist seem to have been excluded from some 
databases. The report finds that demographic data for pastoralist is inaccurate, and this blunder 
has been exacerbated by cultural biases, conflicts, and migration patterns which makes it 
challenging to draw any absolute conclusions regarding patterns and trends of pastoral 
population demography. Following the recognition of the complexity of the issue of data on 
demography in pastoral societies, the report provides an indicative picture, rather than a 
detailed analysis; and highlights relevant issues. There are evidences indicating the exclusion of 
pastoralist populations (that inhabit the ASALs) from the national databases. “In Kenya until 
2003, the Demographic and Health Survey did not cover northern Kenya, where most 
pastoralist districts are located. In Ethiopia, the Population and Housing Census of 1994 
excluded some areas of Afar and Somali regions, which are classified as pastoralist. There was 
improvement in the Ethiopian 2005 Demographic and Health Survey, but still some skew in the 
sampling frame and coverage (ODI, 2010).” Adding up to the dearth of data on human 
pastoralist populations, there is also insufficient data on the number of livestock available. 
However, there have been more surveys and censuses on livestock demography, yet, there are 
no indexes that can aid specific analysis of the livestock holding of pastoralists. Although Kenya 
have not had a livestock survey for decades, there have been livestock censuses in Ethiopia, 
Uganda and Tanzania. The lack of data on pastoral demography appear to have been 
influenced by the increasing pressure from conflicts, lack of access to resources, and climate 
change on pastoral societies in the ASAL area; which has ultimately affected their settlement 
patterns. The IDO (2010) study asserts that the population density and settlement pattern of 
pastoralists seem to be framed by marginalisation, as well as external and internal pressures. 
Understanding the demographic structure of the Ethiopian and Kenyan pastoralists requires an 
observation of other variables such as age structure, fertility rate, mortality rate, and in-and-out 
migration among others. The demographic and health survey conducted among pastoralists in 
Ethiopia shows that on average, pastoralist women have 5.2 children which doesn’t differ much 
from the national average of 5.9 documented in the 1990s. However, there was a slight drop in 
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the 2000s where report indicated a figure of 5.0 in pastoralists against the national average of 
5.4 (ODI. 2010). The data for Kenyan pastoralist indicates a similar fertility rate trend, with the 
numbers soaring in the 1990s from the 1980s. The IDO report moans of an inaccessibility of 
individual Kenyan district data, the Kenyan census (demographic and health survey) aggregates 
to provincial level. Growth rate data for Kenya and Ethiopia indicates an increasing pastoral 
population. In Kenya, both the arid and semi-arid pastoral districts have showed a general 
growth rate higher than the figures from the 1990s. Particularly the arid districts of Turkana, 
Wajir, Mandera and Garissa all appear to have higher growth rates. However, the 
aforementioned districts are boundary districts and one of the reason for increased population 
might be attributed to the back flow of refugees mostly triggered by conflicts. The risk of double-
counting (which can lead to exaggerated factual data of growth rate) is highly likely due to the 
difficulty in registering refugees. Pastoral districts also have a low infant mortality rate which can 
be connected with cultural taboos that prohibits speaking about the dead - which can ultimately 
lead to the registration of fewer deaths than occurred (ODI, 2010). The table below shows the 
growth rate of Kenyan pastoral districts.  
 
 
Figure 4. Population growth rates ( in %) in Kenya pastoral districts. Source: RoK (2006) in IDO (2010) 
 
From the table above, one can observe that the growth rate of the Turkana pastoralist, during 
the last decade (1989 - 1999) of the 20th century, was around 14%, compared to the steep 
decrease of around 4.0% observed around the first decade of the 21st century. 
 
Dr. Sean Avery (a hydrology and water resource consultant) provided some information about 
the population of some pastoral tribes around the lake Turkana area, in his 2012 report on the 
53 
impacts of dam and irrigation development on lake Turkana’s hydrology and fisheries. The 2009 
Kenyan census results indicates that 650,000 people occupy the Turkana pastoral district 
(Avery, 2012). 
 
5.6 Local people’s opinions and observations 
 
In appendix 2 notes and quotes from the documentary “When the water ends: Africa’s Climate 
Conflicts” have been written down. Apart from some describing notes, it consist of quotes from 
two experts, a member of the Kenyan parliament and from several members of tribes in the 
lower Omo Valley and in the Turkana area.  
 
One of the experts, Dr. Richard Anyah, points out that local people’s observations are important 
, called indigenous science. The pastoral people used their knowledge to adapt to e.g. droughts 
but with climate change they no longer understand the seasons. Another expert, Jeanine 
Cooper, points out that the pastoral people´s reaction to scarcity is to protect what they have. In 
times of drought, the population move to wherever the resources are, which triggers conflicts. 
 
 About two dozen of tribes depends on the Omo River and Lake Turkana. Members from four of 
these tribes were interviewed. Members from from the Merille and Nyangatom tribes(Ethiopia) 
said “we fight the Turkana people over grazing land” “ When the Turkana people come we are 
ready for them” “The conflicts are always unexpected, suddenly the Turkana people attacks and 
kill anyone”.    
 
As a result of climate change Lake Turkana have retreated into Kenya since 1973. Ethiopian 
pastoralists follow the water into Kenya, resulting in inter-tribal conflicts. Members from the 
Turkana people claim: “Then the drought came, the enemies and diseases” “These bandits from 
Ethiopia took everything” “The Ethiopian government is giving guns to the locals, but we have 
no ammunition”.  
 
A member of the Kenyan government claimed: “The Merille people of Ethiopia are staying 15 
km inside Kenya. They have stopped our Turkana people from fishing. They have thrown us out 
of the pastures” “ We have allowed communities to continue fighting”. See appendix 2. 
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6. Analysis 
 
In this chapter we will be analysing the connections and interaction of change in the 
environment, caused by climate change, and conflicts. Further on we will analyse the so called 
spiral of violence and the feeling of insecurity in the Turkana area. 
 
6.1 Connections between violence and change in environment 
 
It is important to account for complexities in the relationship between climate change and 
conflicts. Thus, there are multiple pathways and feedbacks between climate system, natural 
resources, societal stability, and human security, see figure 5. More recent studies pay attention 
to the vulnerability of natural and social systems towards the climate change impacts.  
(Scheffran et al 2012: 336) 
 
 
Figure 5: Analytical framework of the linkage between the climate system, natural resources, societal 
stability and human security (Scheffran et al 2012: 870).   
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The relationship between climate change and violent conflict has to be seen in conjunction with 
vulnerability. Farmers and pastoralist in Africa are almost without insurance against livestock 
and harvest losses caused by changes in the climate (eg. flood and droughts). Like other people 
who are very dependent on natural resources, eg. fishermen, they are particularly vulnerable. 
The Turkana area is both a hotspot of violent pastoral conflict, and is pronounced vulnerable to 
climate change, and as described in chapter 5.4, there is a long tradition of raiding in this area 
(Schilling et al 2014: 2).   
 
 
 
Figure 6: Elements of vulnerability (Schilling et al 2014: 6) 
 
Vulnerability can be broken down into three elements: Exposure to climate change; Sensitivity 
to climate change; and adaptive capacity. As described in chapter 5.2 the Turkana area is very 
exposed by changes in climate. Kenya is, in general, very sensitive to these climate changes for 
several reasons. Water is already stressed (scarce), and the economy is highly dependent on 
reliable rain for agriculture, which contributes 23 % of Kenya’s GDP and employs 75 % of the 
labor. The adaptive capacity is characterized as the potential and ability of a system to respond 
successfully to climate variability and change. This concept is divided into indicators for generic 
adaptive capacity such as income/economic, education, and health. Furthermore other 
indicators exist for impact-specific adaptive capacity such as institutions, knowledge, and 
technology. Kenya has a low income level and wealth is very unevenly distributed.  Kenya has a 
very high unemployment rate of 40 % and the standard of education is low, resulting in that the 
Turkana people will not have the skills to take up new opportunities, which new business in the 
area might provide. Especially in rural northern Kenya the population does not have sufficient 
access to education. When it comes to health the access to drinking water is especially low in 
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rural areas (59 % has access) and Kenya has the 5th highest numbers of hazards caused by 
HIV/AIDS in the world.  Kenya has a high level of corruption and the level of knowledge lies a 
little below the continent’s average. The limited adaptive capacity in combination with a high 
level of sensitivity and the strong climate change exposure make the country vulnerable to 
changes eg. in the climate (Schilling et al 2014: 5-11).  
 
Several studies have examined climatic and environmental factors as drivers for conflicts in 
Kenya, which all find a mostly indirect link between the occurrence of violence and 
environmental and/or climate factors, particularly in pastoral areas. Existing theories of resource 
scarcity and abundance provide opposite explanations, which points to the opinion that the 
causes are more complex. Schilling et al have tried to find an explanation to this by combining 
analysing of climate and raiding data and interviewing pastoral people in Turkana and rivals in 
the Pokot area (Schilling et al 2014: 11-13).   
 
In the table below data from annual precipitation and temperature at Lodwar (situated in the 
central part of the Turkana area) are shown in connection with data for raiding. It shows that 
while the temperature have increased by nearly 1 degree in the period, the number of raids has 
also increased. Also, there statistically significance; for example in 2007 there was a fall out of 
the trend (Schilling et al 2014: 13) .      
  
 
Table 2: Precipitation, temperature and number of raids in Turkana between 2006 and 2009 (Schilling et 
al 2012: 13). 
 
There was not found any distinct features when correlating monthly values for temperature 
against different values for violence. However, this was found for precipitation.  The trend shows 
a decrease in precipitation and an increase in number of raids during the same period (2006-
2009).  The analysis of raiding and climate data in Turkana shows no uniform effect of climatic 
conditions on the number of raids.  As illustrated in figure 7, the dry period in 2009 does 
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correlate with an increase in the number of raid. Also, the number of raids in the wet-season (in 
2008 and 2006) increased (Schilling et al 2014: 14).  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Precipitation and monthly number of raids in Turkana between 2006 and 2009 (Schilling et al 
2011: 13). 
 
The results from the interviews showed that in regular years with sufficient rainfall, the raidings 
are mostly conducted before and during the wet seasons, according to the best conditions for 
the raids.  An example of a suitable condition for raiding is the high vegetation that provides 
cover, and the state of the animals' health. However, in periods with failing precipitation (which 
leads to a certain threshold of scarcity has been reached), raid and violence is carried out 
despite the conditions; partly to compensate for drought-related livestock losses and partly to 
protect and keep control of pasture areas and water resources (Schilling et al 2014: 15).  
 
The conflicts between the pastoral people increases their vulnerability. In the period between 
2006 and 2009, 592 people were killed during raids in Turkana; and in addition to this comes 
the injured, which are mostly young men. This means that the communities lose an essential 
part of their workforce, which is particularly critical during droughts, where there is a need to 
cover longer distances to find pasture and water. Between 2006 and 2009, the loss of livestocks 
were more than 90,000, due to the raids. Particularly in a very dry year, 2009, the loss of 
livestocks due to raiding was high (about 38,000 animals) in the Turkana, and West Pokot area 
(Schilling et al 2014: 15-17). The loss of livestock undermine the food security and economic 
situation which weakens the communities capacity for adaption and limits their options for 
adjusting the composition of their herds. The raidings also lead to a feeling of insecurity and 
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distrust within the communities, which may promote ineffective use of resources. For example 
they may avoid certain areas with an increased likelihood of getting attacked (Schilling et al 
2014: 16-17).   
 
 
 
Figure 8: Schematic overview of climate change, conflict and vulnerability. The conflicts increase the 
vulnerability of the communities to climate change in various direct and indirect ways (Schilling et al 2014: 
15-16).  
 
Thus, the relationship between climate change and conflicts is a two-way relationship, as 
conflicts increase the vulnerability of pastoral people by undermining their adaptive capacity to 
changes in the climate (Schilling et al 2014: 18).    
 
 
6.2.Spiral of violence. Feeling of insecurity in Turkana. 
 
6.2.1. Spiral of violence 
This part of the paper will focus mainly on the concept of violence. Throughout this paper, 
raiding has been and will be described and analysed. Raiding does often include violent 
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behaviour. So, the concept of violence does also include raiding. Consequently, it is important to 
recognize that the following figure, spiral of violence, does also imply to the descriptions and 
analysis of raiding in this paper.  
 
The understanding of violence will be based on the concept of the spiral of violence, which is a 
figure that is created specifically to fit an area defined as north-western Kenya. An area in which 
the Turkana people live.  
 
 
Figure 9. Spiral of violence.(Scheffran. 2014: 377) 
 
 
Insecurity is the starting point of the figure, as can be observed from the figure. Insecurity is 
therefore also the starting point to the creation of violence (Scheffran. 2014: 377). The concept 
of insecurity in this figure does encounter security from different aspects. One aspect being that 
security is related to violence. Another aspect indicates that security is related to resources, 
such as food and water. As defined by Scheffran (2014): “the key causes of pastoral insecurity 
are hostile interactions with other pastoral groups and resource scarcity varying with climatic 
conditions” (Scheffran. 2014: 377). From figure 9, it can be observed that insecurity leads to 
distrust. This could be distrust between the different tribes, or within the tribes. It could also, for 
example, be distrust towards the government. The consequence of distrust is thereafter an 
increase in the use of arms by the people. This does not, however, mean that the violence can 
only take place if the people are armed. There is, though, a general increase in the amount of 
weapons when there is an increase in distrust (Scheffran. 2014: 377). All the aforementioned 
aspects then leads towards an increase of violence in that given area.  
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Both sides of the figure represents the aspect that are important to the spiral of violence. One 
side, called Violence multiplier, affects the spiral of violence by increasing the insecurity, 
distrust, arming and therefore violence. The other side, called violence preventer, affects the 
spiral of violence by decreasing the insecurity, distrust, arming and therefore also decreasing 
the violence.  
 
Another crucial feature of figure 9 is that the violence leads to an increase in insecurity. This 
illustrates how the system and creation of violence is self-reinforcing. That further violence will 
lead to further insecurity, which will lead to greater distrust and arming, and then back to an 
increase in violence. So, to summarize, it is important to understand that the violence in the 
Turkana area, can actually have been created and reinforced by previous violence in the same 
area.  
 
Porto (2002) does also emphasize the importance in looking at violence as a self-perpetuating 
cycle (Porto. 2002:18). This should be understood in the way that violent behaviour will: “Involve 
an increase in the levels of anger, hatred, resentment, fear or desire for revenge of the part of 
those suffering damage” (Porto. 2002:18). The violent behaviour will therefore, by itself, 
escalate the conflict. Porto (2002) does consequently introduce two concepts in order to 
describe two different conditions. One condition being “conflict-as-process”, which has a focus 
on the conflict as being a process that continually maintains because of the violence itself. The 
other condition being “conflict-as-startup conditions”, which has a focus on the beginning of the 
conflict. Thereupon, Porto (2002) outlines that over time seeing the conflict as being “conflict-as-
process” often becomes more important than seeing the conflict as being “conflict-as-startup 
conditions”.  
 
 
6.2.2. Spiral of violence. Motives for violence. 
 
The following figure aims at including a broader perspective to figure 9, spiral of violence, and to 
include the concept of raiding. A broader perspective that also includes and comprehension of 
the motives and effects of raiding and conflicts. 
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Figure 10. Motives and effects of raiding and conflict in Turkana and Pokot (Schilling et al. 2012:9) 
 
This figure provides a detailed understanding of the relationship between many factors, but with 
a common box that affects all other parts. This common box is defined as “raiding/conflict”. This 
box is closely related to the concept of violence, since raiding and conflict behaviour often is 
violent. It can be observed, in figure 10, that “expansion of territory”, “commercialization of 
raiding”, “payment of dowry/wealth”, “poverty/hunger” and “small arms” are all elements that 
affect and increase the raiding and the conflict, and therefore also the violence. The raiding and 
the conflicts does thereafter influence these boxes; “loss of livestock”, “loss of pasture/water”, 
“distrust in other communities”, “(perception of) insecurity” and “loss of human lives/injuries”.  
 
The following figure, called figure 11, does attempt to combine the understanding of violence 
from figure 9 and the understanding of the motives and effects of raiding and conflicts from 
figure 10.  
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Figure. 11. “Spiral of violence”, related to “Motives and effects of raiding and conflict in Turkana and 
Pokot”. 
 
From this figure 11, it can be seen how the figures relate to each other. Both emphasizes 
insecurity and distrust as being consequences of raiding and conflicts, and therefore violence. 
Figure 10 does, however, focus more on the motives for this violence in the Turkana and Pokot 
area. So, conclusively, is can be summarized that “expansion of territory”, “commercialization of 
63 
raiding”, “payment of dowry”, “poverty/hunger” are motives for raiding and the conflicts. It can 
also be concluded that violence itself leads to an increase in violence, through the rise of 
insecurity, distrust, and arming. So, the understanding of a given conflict can be understood as 
both “conflict-as-process” and “conflict-as-startup conditions”. The comprehension of conflicts in 
Turkana and Pokot, based on the spiral of violence, does unquestionably emphasize that the 
conflict in this given area should be understood as “conflict-as-process”. However, not saying 
that the origin of the conflict cannot be influential to the understanding of the conflict. This 
means that understanding the conflicts is not directly equal to understanding the source of the 
conflict. The conflict is continuously changed by multiple different aspects, as can be seen from 
figure 9 and figure 10. 
 
However, what are those specific aspects? Figure 9 and figure 10 are arguably different in their 
explanation of the specific aspects that create the raiding and conflicts, and therefore also 
violence. Looking at figure 9, spiral of violence, it can be seen that violence itself is a trigger for 
further violence. However, it is arguably, based on figure 10, important to understand that there 
may be other motives for raiding and the conflicts. Accordingly, the aspects that are important 
for the increase of raiding and conflicts, and therefore also violence, are based both on the 
assumption that violence itself increase violence, but also on the motives for raiding and 
conflicts illustrated in figure 10.  
 
 
6.2.3. Feeling of insecurity in Turkana. 
 
This part of the paper will be based on figure 9, spiral of violence. The general conclusion, 
based on this figure, is that insecurity can increase the amount of violence in these pastoral 
areas. It is therefore relevant to investigate the sense of insecurity in the Turkana area.  
The pie chart below, figure 12, illustrates the perception of insecurity in both the southern 
Turkana area (Left) and northern Pokot area (Right). 63 people were interviewed in the southern 
Turkana area, and 49 people were interviewed in the northern Pokot area. 
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Figure 12. Perception of insecurity in southern Turkana (Left) and northern Pokot (Right). 
Turkana, 63 people were interviewed; In Pokot, 49. (Schilling et al. 2012:12) 
 
It is important to notice that the investigation in the southern Turkana area is based on 
interviews of 63 people. Can the interviews of 63 people be sufficient enough to conclude 
something about the feeling of insecurity in an area that inhabits over 200,000 people? (Fratkin 
2001:3). The investigation should therefore not be used to conclude detailedly about the feeling 
of insecurity in the entire Turkana area. It is also important to notice that the investigation is 
based on interviews of people in an area defined as southern Turkana. However, the amount of 
people in the investigation that has classified themselves as being secure is significantly low. 
Only 3 percent have answered that they feel secure. So, it can be clearly concluded, based on 
the fact that 96 percent feel insecure/ highly insecure, that the people of Turkana are generally 
feeling insecure. This is an important fact when you consider the understanding of conflicts in 
pastoral areas that is provided earlier based on the spiral of violence figure. Following this, it is 
probable that the high feeling of insecurity leads towards an increase in distrust and arming, and 
thereby an increase in violence. 
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7. Discussion 
 
Theorizing conflicts, in particularly the contemporary “small wars”, are difficult and have through 
time led to many debates and the development of new theories. We have tried to identify the 
main factors that triggers and drive the conflict in the Turkana area.  
   
Firstly, it can be estimated that the Turkana people live in an area that is particularly poor when 
it comes to resources like water and vegetation. It is also estimated in the paper that the 
pastoral people have been living in this area since around 4000 to 4500 BP. Through time they 
have been adapting to living in an area with high resource scarcity, and hard climate conditions 
like extreme heat and occasional droughts; according to their way of living as pastoralist moving 
around for resources. However, the climatic changes that have happened since the end of the 
last century has caused an increase in the temperature, number of droughts, and flooding; and 
generally, the weather has become more unpredictable and varying in occurrence in time and 
space.  Since the 1990s the Turkana people have tried to adapt to this by turning to other 
livelihoods, such as fishing in the Lake Turkana, though this kind of livelihood is not recognized 
in their culture. Apart from leading to a reduction in pasture, the adverse impact of climate 
change has already led to a decrease in the volume of water in Lake Turkana. The Turkana 
people are particularly vulnerable to climate change as they are very dependent on natural 
resources. 
 
The trend for the future annual precipitation is still uncertain, but it is projected that the variability 
of rainfall in time and space will continue to increase giving even more unpredictable and 
extreme rainfall events. The region is experiencing a faster warming than the global average 
and the predicted rise in temperature is up to 2,8 ° C  by 2060 and up to 4,5 °C by year 2090. 
This will lead to further crop failure, poor pasture conditions and reduction of water-resources. In 
addition the development of the lower Omo Valley will indirectly affect  the Turkana area and the 
pastoralist living here, as the hydro-power projects and irrigation projects will result in a 
significant drop in the level of Lake Turkana’s water by about 20 m, that will lead to a severe 
reduction in the amount of consumable fish. Apart from serving as opportunities for fisheries, the 
lake also serves as a source of drinking water for the people and their livestock, which is 
particularly important as only a little more than half of the rural population in Kenya have access 
to drinking water sources. A side-effect of the drop in the lake’s water volume will mean an 
increase in salinity, leading to an aggravation of the water quality in Lake Turkana, and by time 
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reducing the value of the water as it becomes undrinkable. As such there are several factors 
that have an impact on Lake Turkana as an important resource for water and fisheries,  
  
The Turkana people’s neighbouring tribes in Ethiopia experience other more direct effects 
caused by the hydro-power project and the irrigation project in the Omo Valley, that are both 
supported by foreign donors. This area has a more dense population than in the Turkana area, 
and these people face increasing scarcity as a result of reduction in flood-retreat agriculture and 
grazing areas on the banks of the Omo River, as there will be a decrease in the flooding of 
these areas. Furthermore, the local people in the Omo Valley are getting evicted by the 
authorities due to the economically viable option of transforming the land into commercial 
farming, by people coming from outside the area. Some of these areas used to be national 
parks but when it came to commercial interest this was not enough to protect the pastoral 
people’s traditional livelihood. By that, accumulation by dispossession, and greed are seen to be 
caused by foreign investors, for example via land grabbing. The whole development of the Omo 
Valley is also part of the historic and present expansion of the Ethiopian state building process.     
  
The increase in scarcity by both the Turkana people and the neighbouring tribes to the north in 
Ethiopia and to the west where the Pokot people live, leads to an increase in competition for the 
scars resources and a change and increased in their movement in the search for resources, as 
predicted in some theories.  As the paper mentions, the conflict in this region span wider 
geographically and include a broader constellation of actors. As such the conflicts cuts across 
national borders. Water does not respect borders either, and a country’s environmental 
resource management policy might therefore affect the conditions in another country, as is seen 
in this case. Also during the planning of the hydro-power projects and the irrigation-projects, the 
Turkana people were not taken into account for the assessment on impacts and were not being 
heard for their opinion, neither by the Ethiopian nor the Kenyan government. This is an example 
of how marginalized these people are. International agencies, as shown in the paper, have dealt 
very little with this kind of international water-resource conflict.        
  
Apart from the future increase of impacts caused by climate change, and the Lake Turkana 
water volume reduction, other commercial interests like the planned wind farm, and exploration 
for oil are potential factors to affect the Turkana people. Whether these projects will lead to 
accumulation by dispossession is still unknown. Based on the research, though, it is has been 
noted that a certain amount of land-grabbing activities go on in the Turkana area. 
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70 percent of the area of Kenya is defined as pastoral area. The Turkana area does take a 
recognizable part of these 70 percent. This paper has specifically focused on conflicts and 
violence in the Turkana area, but has also focused on specific inter tribal conflicts, such as the 
conflict between the Turkana and the Merille tribes and the conflict between the Turkana and 
Pokot people. It is important to get an understanding of the social structure of the Turkana tribe, 
and such an understanding has been provided. It is concluded that the Turkana tribe consist of 
twenty-nine clans, and that the social organization is based on the awi. The awi does, as 
already described, consist of a man, his wives, their children and usually also of a number of 
dependent women. However, why is this social organization important to understand? It is 
important to understand the social organization in order to understand the violence in the 
Turkana area. This is since that the social organization creates the structures that determine 
who you would eventually commit, for example, raids against.  
Focusing on raiding, it is important to recognize the cultural and social acceptance that raiding 
has. Raiding is described as being correlated with pastoral traditions and traditionally to be 
based on established norms and principles. Consequently, is this an important reason behind 
the occurrence of raiding, and therefore also violence? It could arguably be, but the 
environmental factors, as described in the paper, should also be understood as essential to the 
occurrence of raiding and violence. However, considering the motives for raiding, as illustrated 
in table 1, which showed that 78 percent of the Turkana people said that “hunger” was the 
primary motive for raiding, it can also be argued that the main reason for raiding is survival and 
that the pastoral traditions are not really important to the occurrence of raiding.  
Other factors can also be estimated as being important for the occurrence of raiding. Previously 
in the paper, it was described how people from outside the Turkana area itself have investigated 
in raiding. This has previously been described as commercialized raiding.  Furthermore, 
weapons should also be considered as a factor for raiding. People from outside the Turkana 
area sell weapons to people within the Turkana area. So, investments from outside the Turkana 
area, in raiding and selling weapons, should also be considered as a factor that contributes to 
an increase in the amount of raids and violence.  
 
It can be estimated, based on the paper, that these climatic changes have been, and are, an 
influential factor for the amount of violence in the area. The information about annual 
precipitation and raids per year, as can be seen in table 2, does clearly indicate a correlation 
between the amount of precipitation and the amount of raids. In years with sufficient rains, the 
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raids usually occur before and during the wet season. However, the last decades event of 
pronounced drought e.g. in 2009 have led to a significant increase in the raiding. Thus, in the 
Turkana area scarcity of natural resources, like water and pasture, as well as grievances has a 
role as a primary trigger of conflicts.  It is therefore also closely related to “hunger”. The 
estimation that raids occur mainly because of traditions is disproved by the matter that scarcity 
at a certain threshold (like in 2009) seem to overrule the traditional time-structures for raiding. 
Greed plays an indirect role, as seen from ongoing projects in the Omo Valley.  
 
Studies have suggested that the political and economic marginalisation (through neglect in 
public policy) of the Kenyan pastoralists have resulted in their economic stagnation. 
Furthermore, it is acclaimed that institutional failure has put a bottleneck on the overall 
development of the pastoral economy in Kenya. It is important to note that the Turkana 
pastoralist have not be totally abandoned by the Kenyan public institutions. Over time, the 
government has considered different economic and development policies; nevertheless, the 
majority of the policies have failed, for various reasons. The study by Omiti et al, (2002) 
suggests that issues such as a lack of political will to implement proposed policies, and the 
inconsistency and unpredictability of formulated policies have contributed to their failure in 
pastoral area development. Furthermore the limited use of research in the formulation stage of 
policies, and the limited use of a top-down approach (that involves the key or all stakeholders) in 
policy formulation have played a role in the failure of government policies. Thus, the claim in 
some theories that the weakening of states play a central role in contemporary conflicts may 
play a role in a post-colonial state like Kenya.  
 
Moreover, other factors can also be important to understand the amount of raids and violence in 
the area. Among these, are education and the population age structure. It has previously been 
defined that a high population of young men is a factor that increases the risk of violence. It can 
be estimated that the population of the Turkana people is approximately 200,000. There is, 
though, a scarcity of national data on Turkana demographics. It is therefore not possible to 
conclude something detailed about the population age structure of the Turkana people. 
Focusing on education, it can be concluded that the level of literacy in the nomadic area is 3%, 
compared to the national Kenyan average of 79.3%. This indicates that  it can generally be 
concluded that the education level for the Turkana people is relatively low. This is partly due to 
the lack of investments in education in the area, as specified previously in the paper.  
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The necessity of getting accurate data on pastoralist population demographics cannot be over 
emphasised. It is especially necessary in the context of trying to understand the factors that 
have contributed to the onset of conflicts in the area. The Malthusian theory have suggested 
that an increasing population and depleting resources are factors that intertwine to ensue in the 
outbreak of inter-tribal and other types of conflicts. Applying this notion to the Turkana pastoral 
area in Kenya requires a somewhat accurate knowledge of the population and other 
demographic data. Considering the remote location (ecologically marginal lands) of most 
pastoral tribes, political marginalisation, and exclusion from some national databases, a 
significant challenge thus arises in analysing the applicability of the population-conflict 
hypothesis in the Turkana area.  
 
Many of these factor contribute to the vulnerability of the Turkana people as their adaptive 
capacity are limited according to as a low income level, uneven distributed wealth, low 
education level and low health level.     
 
The information about violence, which is gained from the spiral of violence figure, suggest that 
the violence itself is an important attribute to further violence. It can also be observed, from the 
same figure, that violence firstly leads towards an increase in insecurity. It is important to notice 
that insecurity is understood as both resource insecurity and also insecurity related to violence. 
So, the decrease in precipitation does lead towards resource scarcity and resource insecurity. 
Resource insecurity does thereafter, according to the spiral of violence, lead towards distrust, 
arming and ultimately an increase in violence. Accordingly, the numbers from figure 12, which 
indicates a high feeling of insecurity among Turkana people, is significant in this aspect. The 
percentages in the investigation was as following; not specified 1 percent, secure 3 percent, 
highly insecure 24 percent, insecure 72 percent. So, this high feeling of insecurity in the 
Turkana area could lead to distrust, arming and violence.  
Other motives for raiding, besides insecurity, are also presented in figure 2 and 3.  Those are 
“expansion of territory”, “commercialization of raiding” and “payment of dowry/wealth”. The 
fourth motivation for raiding is defined as “poverty/hunger”, this one is closely related to the 
precipitation, resources and therefore also insecurity. This illustrates that there are multiple 
motives for raiding.  
 
The necessity of getting accurate data on pastoralist population demographics cannot be over 
emphasised. It is especially necessary in the context of trying to understand the factors that 
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have contributed to the onset of conflicts in the area. The Malthusian theory have suggested 
that an increasing population and depleting resources are factors that intertwine to ensue in the 
outbreak of inter-tribal and other types of conflicts. Applying this notion to the Turkana pastoral 
area in Kenya requires a somewhat accurate knowledge of the population and other 
demographic data. Considering the remote location (ecologically marginal lands) of most 
pastoral tribes, political marginalisation, and exclusion from some national databases, a 
significant challenge thus arises in analysing the applicability of the population-conflict 
hypothesis in the Turkana area.  
 
 
Opinions from the local people living in the lower Omo Valley and in the Turkana area, show 
that they claim each other for taking the initiative to the conflicts and that the governments on 
both sides support their own people to continue the conflicts. But unlike some other conflicts 
they seem to remember what that first triggered the conflict - scarcity of natural resources.   
 
Also the adaptive capacity is getting reduced by the violence itself, according to the number of 
killed and injured people, particularly young men who is an essential part of the work force, the 
loss of livestock and thereby loss of food security and the loss of water and pasture resources.  
Thus, conflicts that at first was triggered by climate change and scarcity of resources leads to 
the contribution of even more vulnerability by undermining the Turkana peoples adaptive 
capacity to further changes in the climate.   
 
As mentioned in the paper Homer-Dixons stated, back in 1994, that climate change will 
probably not have a major effect on conflicts for several decades. We now, only two decades 
later, have strong indications of that this unfortunately was a wrong prediction. 
 
Scarcity caused by climate change and access and control of resources like pastures and water 
seem to be the primary factor in the occurrence of contemporary conflicts in the Turkana area. 
Factor’s like grievance and greed motivate the conflicts but many other factor also contribute to 
the conflicts and is characterized by a great deal of complexity. Climate change has to be 
solved on a global level, but several of the other factors could be solved nationally or locally as 
any factor or measure that may be geared to decrease the vulnerability also might be able to 
decrease violence.      
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8. Conclusion 
 
Conclusively, it can be estimated that conflicts in the Turkana area are very complex and are 
driven by many factors. One factor that will be emphasized for the Turkana area is scarcity of 
natural resources, mainly pastures and water, that are caused by climate change and 
commercial interests. 
The recent year’s climate change has led to a reduction in pasture, and a decline of the volume 
of water in Lake Turkana. In addition, projects of hydro-power and irrigation, supported by the 
Ethiopian government and foreign interests, at the Omo River leads to a significant reduction of 
volume of the lake’s water, resulting in scarcity of  both drinkable water and fisheries. Pastoral 
people living in the Omo Valley are being dispossessed by authorities in the interest of these 
commercial projects. The increase in scarcity for people in both the Turkana and the Omo area 
has led to an increase in competition and inter-tribal conflicts. These marginalized people were 
not taken into account in the planning of the projects. Like other pastoral people, the Turkana 
people are particularly vulnerable to climate change, as they are very dependent on natural 
resources. Though raiding is correlated to pastoral traditions and has cultural and social 
acceptance within the tribes in the area, most Turkana people say that hunger and survival is 
the main reason for raiding. Correlation between climate variables like precipitation and 
temperature and conflicts show that climate change are an influential factor for the amount of 
violence and raidings in the area, especially when the lack of precipitation reach a certain 
threshold.   
Other factors being identified as drivers for conflicts are commercial raidings, availability of  
weapons, political and economic marginalisation, a low income level, uneven distribution of 
wealth, limited use of research in the formulation stage of policies, a low level of education, 
population growth, expansion of territory and payment of dowry. Many of these factors 
contribute to the vulnerability of the Turkana people and their adaptive capacity. Resource 
insecurity leads to distrust, arming and an increase in violence. But also insecurity caused by 
violence  leads to new violence, according to the spiral of violence theory. Thus, violence itself 
is an important attribute to further violence.  
Also the adaptive capacity, towards coping with scarcity, is getting reduced by the impact of 
violence by leading to a lack of labor and food insecurity in the communities.  
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Appendix 1 
Satellite images of the shrinking Lake Turkana 
 
Satellite image of Lake Turkana and the Omo River. Feb. 1, 1973, Landsat 1. (Path/row 182/57). 
 
Satellite image of Lake Turkana and Omo River. Jan 17, 2011, Landsat 5. Path/row 169/57.  Source for both satellite 
images: U. S. Geological  Survey. Earthshots: Satellite Images of Environmental Change. USGS: Science for a 
changing world. http://earthshots.usgs.gov/earthshots/Lake-Turkana#ad-image-6. 
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Appendix 2 
 
Quotes and notes of the documentary “When the Water Ends” 
 
The documentary: “When The Water Ends: Africa’s Climate Conflicts 
Producer: Jennifer Redfearn, With support from: Center for investigative reporting and 
United Nations Foundation. MediaStorm. To be found on permaculturenews.org 
 
The quotes are set in “” and sequenced. The rest is notes taken directly from the movie. 
 
8 million semi-Nomadic people in southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya survive by following 
water sources. About two dozen tribes depend on the Omo River and Lake Turkana (Four of 
them: Mursi and Nyangatom (in Ethiopia) and Dassanech (partly in Ethiopia and partly in 
Kenya) and Turkana Tribe). 
 
Jeanine Cooper, Head of office, Kenya, UN office for coordination of humanitarian affairs:  
 
1)“Pastoralist are used to move around to wherever the resources happen to be. They have the 
same aspirations as we all do. They want to have their families, they want to live in security, 
they want to be able to eat every day” “And I dare say that their needs are much fewer than ours 
in the developed world. Pastoralisme is a way of life that’s based on the opportunistic search for 
resources. The reaction to that when there’s scarcity is to protect what you have. And so there’s 
continuous conflict between pastoralist groups” 
 
2) “In times of drought, the population will move to wherever the resources are. It does trigger 
conflict quite often. In years of scarcity, they’re happening almost every day”. 
 
3)“ During the last decade there’ve been 3 major droughts and several minor drought years. It 
means that the population never have time to recover. The increasing variability of rainfall is well 
documented. In space there is also a greater variability - You can have heavy downpour in one 
area and a few km away no rain. And we experience it now” 
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4) “What we see in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia are climate change conflicts. We see them 
every day. There’s going to be more of them and they are going to be worse”. 
 
5)” We’re not yet getting it right in terms of Eastern Africa humanitarian response to drought. 
The knee jerk first reaction: every time there’s a drought, people send food. People are given 
maize, Which you can not eat raw, you have to cook it with water, and there’s no water. The 
ways that we’ve responded to droughts and floods has been almost purely humanitarian. We’ve 
not taken a long term development approach to handling those disasters. Billions of dollars flow 
into these countries supposedly to humanitarian response. Is it effective? No. Because the 
drought is coming again. We risk doing what Jan Egeland says: Saving people’s lives today, so 
that they can die tomorrow”. 
 
6) “You’ll got to see it to understand the vast disparity between those who are contributing to 
climate change and those who are having to deal with the impact. We all have a responsibility 
towards each other. We are all inhabitants of the same earth. They are not asking to become 
millionaires, they’re just asking survive” 
 
7) “Water is the key to resolving many issues. Will water based conflicts increase? Certainly. 
But there is all kinds of different solutions. One of the biggest ones is making the plight of these 
vulnerable people much more visible to the whole world”. 
 
Dr. Richard Anyah, Atmospheric Scientist, Natural Resources and environment, University of 
Connecticut:  
 
1)“The most vulnerable part of the world, in terms of climate change, is Africa and the Horn of 
Africa is considered a climate change hot spot. For the last 40 years you get this recurrent 
drought and a lot of floods. Flood in those areas can aggravate the droughts – the soil becomes 
like a pavement. We will get more persistent droughts in these semi-arid areas” . 
 
2) “ Local people’s observations are important: They have been using their indigenous 
knowledge to adapt to these drought. They relied mostly on the natural cycles, when the 
seasons were more specific. Pastoral people no longer understand the seasons well, eg the 
wind patterns have changed. These observations are important called Indigenous science”  
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3) “Pastoral communities, once it is dry, the next thing they are going to do is to move to the 
marginal areas of the desert. And with time they are going to overgraze those areas. And that is 
going to feed back so those are going to be turned into semi-arid with time. “ The other thing is 
population. There are scarce resources but then the demand is very high. There is serious 
competition for pasture now, because the grazing areas are getting squeezed”   
  
4) “The projections in the coming decades are very clear – it will become warmer and drier in 
this area. We know this is a global problem, Climate knows no boundary. But while this debate 
is going on, Africa is suffering now”  
 
5) “The biggest thing is change of attitude. We have to change the way we do certain things. We 
really need to focus on regionalizing the problem, because the impacts are very unique, 
regionally.” 
 
Head of Mursi people (Ethiopia): “The Omo River is important to us, It allows us to produce 
grain and contains the spirit for our life. Along the river there is a lot of rituals that we do” “ we 
use the river to communicate with our ancestors. It is our lifeblood. And now it is disappearing. 
The river is like a fence for us - if it lowers the Nyangatom will cross the river into our land and 
fight with us” 
 
Head of Nyangatom people (Ethiopia): “ The river used to flow up to the grass, but no longer. It 
was the rain that used to raise the river. When it overflows we get a good harvest. When it is low 
the only option is to grow kidney beans, which is a sign of drought” 
 
Women from Merille tribe(Partly Ethiopia, partly Kenya): “We used to cultivate here, but it dries 
out, then we are starving. On top of it there is an increase in conflict between tribes. The 
Turkana are there. If we go any further, the furious Turkana is on the other side. The conflict is 
always unexpected, suddenly the Turkana attacks and kill anyone they can find”   
 
Nyangatom man(Ethiopia): “We fight the Turkana people over grazing land. There is no peace 
at all” 
  
 Lake Turkana receives 90 % of its water from the Omo River. Rising temperatures and less rain 
have contributed the lakes retreat into Kenya since 1973.  
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Ethiopians are following the water into Kenya. As a result, inter-tribal conflict is increasing 
 
Young men, Nyangatom(Ethiopia): “When the Turkana people come we are ready for them. All 
young people here are the ones who look after the land. Everyone who own cattle has his gun”.  
 
Women from Turkana tribe: “My life depend on the government, I’ve been in this camp for six 
years. All my livestock has been taken away be the enemy and they have killed some of my 
family. These bandits from Ethiopia took everything. In the early days of our life my husband 
struggled really hard and he got 20 goats. Then came the drought, the enemies and diseases. 
Today we only have one donkey. The Ethiopian government is giving guns to the locals, but we 
have no ammunition so we will end up being killed in cold blood. The conflict has become more 
dangerous, before they used spears, but now it has become rampant, because our enemies are 
now using a lot of weapons” 
 
After dozens of Ethiopian tribesmen attacked and killed the head of Kenya’s border Police.  
 
John Nunyes, a member of parliament, visit the Turkana Community: “The Merille of Ethiopia 
are staying 15 km inside Kenya. They have stopped our Turkana people from fishing. They 
have thrown us out of the pastures. We can’t access the waters. We have allowed communities 
to continue fighting and competing over resources without providing security. We can not 
continue having a situation where Kenyans are being displaced, are made refugees in their own 
country” .     
 
In the future we will see more conflicts and they will get worse as a result of climate change. 300 
mill people face water scarcity to day – by 2015 half of the world’s population is expected to 
face a water shortage 
 
The Ethiopian government is building a dam Gibe III, on the Omo river, which will be the largest 
hydropower station project in Sub-Saharan Africa. It will result in reduce of the flow of water into 
the Omo river, threatening the lives of 800,000 tribesmen.   
 
